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Expressive Association and
Anti-Discrimination Law After Dale:
A Tripartite Approach
Dale Carpentert
Is Dale' a disaster?
To many who support equal civil rights for gay people, it
certainly seems so. 2 In Dale, after all, the Supreme Court held
that the First Amendment allowed the Boy Scouts of America
(BSA) to exclude an openly gay scoutmaster despite a state law
forbidding such discrimination. 3 More broadly, the rationale
for the decision-based on the BSA's right of expressive association-has raised fears (for some, hopes) that the Court might
be moving toward a sweeping review of the constitutionality of
numerous state and federal statutes forbidding discrimination
in business-related clubs, public accommodations, and even
employment. 4 At the very least, Dale may have called a constit Associate Professor of Law, University of Minnesota; former Boy
Scout. I would like to thank David Bryden, Guy Charles, Jim Chen, Don
Dripps, Dan Farber, Mae Kuykendall, Robert Levy, Brett McDonnell, David
McGowan, Miranda McGowan, Fred Morrison, Michael Paulsen, Paul Rubin,
and Adam Samaha for their helpful comments. I was assisted immensely in
my thinking about this case by reading David McGowan, Making Sense of
Dale, 18 CONST. COMM. (forthcoming 2001).
1. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446 (2000).
2. In a press release, the nation's largest gay civil rights group, the Human Rights Campaign, called the decision "a travesty of justice." Supreme
Court Upholds Boy Scouts' Ban on Gays, at http'J/www.scoutingforall.org/
news/viewnews.cgi?newsid962759861,43299,.
A spokesperson for the Gay,
Lesbian and Straight Education Network (GLSEN) warned that Dale "sends
the message that gay youth are second class citizens." High Court Grants
Scouts Right to DiscriminateAgainst Gay Youth in Schools, Says GLSEN,
GLSEN NEWS, June 28, 2000, http'/www.scoutingforall.org/news/viewnews.
cginewsid962760747,53726,. The irony of GLSEN's opposition, in particular,
to the result in Dale will become apparent in the discussion of how freedom of
association claims have led to the recognition of gay-straight student alliances
in public schools across the country. See infra Part I.B.3.
3. Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2249.
4. For fears that this might happen, see Nan D. Hunter, Accommodating
the Public Sphere: Beyond a Market Model, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1591, 1591
1515
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tutional halt to the expansion of these anti-discrimination statutes into new areas, like non-business-related membership organizations, traditionally regarded as private.
Of the liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment, the
freedom of association may be the most distrusted.5 To some, it
is an excrescence of the First Amendment, its frightful rightwing step-child. To these critics, the phrase "freedom of association" itself has begun to sound rather like "states' rights"part of the clever code language of conservative politics that is
often nothing more in practice than a seemingly innocuous
cover for bigotry. Like states' rights, the freedom of association
is often seen as threatening legitimate efforts to guarantee full
citizenship and economic opportunity to historically-disfavored
segments of American society. It is principally useful, in this
view, only to protect the prerogatives of people in white hoods,
of sexist old-boys networks, and of homophobes. On this view,
the First Amendment as faithful liberator has become the First
Amendment as revanchist impediment.
This Essay attempts to reclaim the freedom of expressive
association 6 from both its harshest critics and its most ardent
(2001) ("[Dale] may portend a substantial rewriting of expressive association
law .... At a minimum, it weakens the claim to open participation in our
civic culture by lesbians and gay men."), and 1603 (stating that Dale "flatly
contradicts the Court's holding in Runyon v. McCrary" and that "[tihe Dale
majority simply ignores Runyon"). For hopes that this might happen, see
David E. Bernstein, AntidiscriminationLaws and the FirstAmendment, 66
MO. L. REV. 83 ("Dale suggests that the Roberts [v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609
(1984)] era is thankfully over, and that the nine Justices of the Supreme
Court... unanimously believe that antidiscrimination laws must be subject to
the same constitutional scrutiny as other important laws with broad popular
support."); Richard A. Epstein, Free Association: The Incoherence of Antidiscrimination Laws," NAT'L REV., Oct. 9, 2000, at 38, 40 ("Rightly understood,
Dale forces us to confront the multiple forms of forced private association that
have been staples of the New Deal and the Great Society. For starters, ask
whether Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act... can survive constitutional
challenge under the First Amendment."). As I argue in Part III, infra, I think
these reports of the death of anti-discrimination law after Dale are greatly exaggerated.
5. The right to "free exercise" of religion is a close second. See Michael
W. McConnell, Why is Religious Liberty the "FirstFreedom," 21 Cardozo L.
Rev. 1243, 1244 (2000) (noting that many believe that protecting religious liberty "violates the neutrality that lies at the heart of the liberal state").
6. The freedom of association also protects intimate association. Roberts,
468 U.S. at 617-20. This Essay does not treat that aspect of the freedom of association, which was not addressed by the majority or by the dissenters in
Dale. For an argument that New Jersey's anti-discrimination law implicated
BSA troops' freedom of intimate association, see John C. O'Quinn, Note, How

Solemn is the Duty of the Mighty Chief: Mediating the Conflict of Rights in
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libertarian cheerleaders, arguing that Dale will not have the
Part I
revolutionary consequences either camp predicts.
sketches the significance of the freedom of association to the
protection of dissenting opinion, with an emphasis on gay experience. The freedom of expressive association has been especially valuable to gay Americans, who have suffered greatly
when it is not respected. Given First Amendment history, it
should not be surprising that claims by groups to freedom from
state regulation-even more than similar claims by individuals-engender the most skeptical reception. For that very reason, the freedom of expressive association may be one of the
most valuable aspects of First Amendment liberty.
Part II notes the increasing conffict between the freedom of
expressive association and the expanding reach of antidiscrimination law. The challenge is to draw a line between
them that will preserve a large realm for group expression and
organization while allowing the state to promote its equality
objectives in the most compelling contexts. The approach to
this problem suggested by the dissenters in Dale, inviting
courts to focus closely on a group's message, is inherently suspect under First Amendment principles. The Dale dissenters'
approach would likely be systematically unfavorable to unpopular groups, including gay civil rights groups. A message-based
approach also misses much of the subtlety and richness of
speech in general and of group speech in particular.
Part III suggests a tripartite approach that treats associations differently depending on the predominance of protected
expression in the association's activities. This tripartite approach is a way to reconcile the claim for associational freedom
and the need for equality. My analysis develops further an approach suggested in Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Roberts
v. United States Jaycees,7 which upheld the application of a
state anti-discrimination law to a male-only club. 8 Justice
O'Connor's analysis distinguishes predominantly commercial
associations, which do not enjoy fall associational protection,
I add to Justice
from expressive associations, which do.
O'Connor's approach a third, hybrid category of quasiexpressive associations that mix substantial commercial and
significant expressive activity. These associations require an

Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL', 319, 352-64 (2000).

7. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 631-40 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
8. See id. at 617-29.
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activity-specific analysis to avoid trenching on important First
Amendment values: expressive organizational activities for
these hybrid associations should enjoy broad protection from
anti-discrimination law while commercial functions of these
same groups should not.
Even though not yet explicitly recognized by the Court, the
commercial-expressive distinction actually helps to explain the
results in many of the Court's decisions pitting a claim to freedom of association against some state regulation. Although difficult to apply in some circumstances, the tripartite approach
suggested in this article avoids the troubling First Amendment
difficulties of the Dale dissenters' method by focusing analysis
on the activities (rather than on the message) of the group
claiming associational freedom. The tripartite approach preserves valuable associational freedom while saving antidiscrimination law from constitutional invalidation in the areas
where equality guarantees are most critically neededemployment and similar predominantly commercial arenas.
Using gay experience as a guide, I conclude it is wrong to
see an inherent tension between associational freedom and
equality for despised groups. Instead, the freedom of expressive association contributes to equality by allowing people in
groups to find strength and confidence in numbers, bolstering
their civic and political power and contributing to the flow of
ideas so needed for democratic government. Sacrificing associational freedom-beyond the limited area of commercial activity not strongly protected by the First Amendment-puts unpopular groups at the mercy of legislative majorities who have
their own, often hostile, conception of the good life.
Finally, as an original matter, what the Supreme Court
now calls the freedom of expressive association might have
been conceived as an important liberty interest in itself that is
foundational of other liberties. There can be little question associations have played a central role in the political and cultural life of the nation, a role whose significance the word "expressive" hardly captures. Yet the Supreme Court has taken
another path, mooring this freedom in the First Amendment.
This article works within that framework, rather than seeking
a broader grounding for associational rights, recognizing that
the Court may effectively have reached the same result by expansively defining associational freedom.
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I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AS A FREEDOM FOR
ASSOCIATIONS
A standard view of the First Amendment stresses that it
protects the rights of individuals to speak, to publish, to worship, and so on. "If the First Amendment means anything,"
wrote Justice Marshall in Stanley v. Georgia, "it means that a
State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own
house, what books he may read or what films he may watch."9
Commentators, too, have emphasized the importance of the
First Amendment as a tool for "individual self-realization." 1°
While the image of the lone citizen enjoying his First
Amendment sovereignty is powerful and accurate as far as it
goes, it misses much of the history of government's efforts to
regulate the flow of information and ideas. Those efforts have
frequently concentrated on harassing organizations and have
often only incidentally or instrumentally targeted individuals.
That much has been apparent from the first days of life for
modem First Amendment jurisprudence, when government indicted persons but aimed at groups. For every Paul Cohen
prosecuted for walking alone into a courthouse wearing an expletive-laden jacket,1 1 there have been many Anita Whitneys
prosecuted for little more than joining a group the government
12
disfavors.
The chief value of the First Amendment, then, is arguably
not the protection it affords to individual autonomy. Its chief
value may be the role it plays in protecting people who want to
combine with others to promote common causes. This lesson
holds for gay people, who have benefited politically and personally when they organize, and who have suffered terribly when
the state impeded their ability to do so.
The history reviewed below is instructive for analysis of
the Dale case and for consideration of the advantages or disadvantages of a given approach to the conflict between antidiscrimination law and the freedom of expressive association.
However, I do not mean to suggest that the BSA is in nearly as
9. 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) (emphasis added) (striking down a state law
making the private possession of obscenity a crime).
10.

Martin Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591, 593

(1982).
11.

See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 22-26 (1971) (reversing a crimi-

nal conviction for disturbing the peace).
12. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 371 (1927) (affirming a
criminal conviction for membership in the Communist Labor Party).
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vulnerable a position politically and culturally today as were,
say, Communists in the 1920s or black civil rights advocates in
the 1950s. It would be absurd to make such a comparison. The
BSA is a cultural institution with a great hold on many Americans' loyalty, not a political pariah. The Attorney General is
not ordering raids of BSA offices, police are not arresting its
leaders, and attack dogs and water cannons do not greet meetings of Boy Scout troops.
I review the history, instead, for four reasons. First, I
want to emphasize the special role associations-and therefore
government regulation of associations-have played in the development of the First Amendment. Second, if an association
as potent as the BSA can be made to bend to the state's will,
how much more likely is it that weak and truly unpopular
groups might be forced to capitulate? Third, even if an association is generally popular (as the BSA has been), it may have a
particular view that is controversial, and that view may be vulnerable to state regulation (as is the BSA's gay exclusion). The
history discussed below at least counsels caution in allowing
such regulation. Finally, an association popular today may be
reviled tomorrow and vice versa. Thus, First Amendment protection should not vary with a person's or group's opinion poll
standing.
A. EXPRESSiVE ASSOCIATION AND STATE REGULATION

Much of the history of the suppression of speech is the history of the state-sponsored suppression of expressive associations: groups of people who combine their efforts to advance
and to inculcate, either internally or externally, their ideas and
values.
1. The Espionage Act of 1917
Consider the context in which the modern protection of free
speech under the First Amendment arose. As the country entered the First World War, many groups of people were hostile
to U.S. involvement. Anti-war organizations such as the Socialist Party of America made strong gains in 1917, and over
330,000 draft evaders or delinquents were reported during the
war. 13 Concerned about these groups, Congress passed the Espionage Act of 1917, part of which made it a crime to obstruct
13. ROBERT JusTIN GOLDSTEIN, POLITICAL REPRESSION IN MODERN
AMERICA 105-08 (1978).
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the recruiting and enlistment of military personnel or to at14
tempt to cause insubordination in the military service.
Although the Espionage Act itself was directed at individuals, many World War I prosecutions charged conspiracy to
violate it, a charge that inherently aimed at stopping expressive association by opponents of the war. In Schenck v. United
States,15 the decision that first announced the "clear and present danger" test for punishing subversive advocacy, the government charged that the defendants, part of a group of anticapitalist leftists, conspired to violate the Act by mailing to
military personnel a document criticizing conscription as "despotism" and urging conscripts to "assert your opposition to the
draft."16
Similarly, in Pierce v. United States, the government
charged the defendants, part of a group of Socialists, with a
conspiracy to violate the Act by distributing an anti-war pamphlet.17
The Court affirmed the convictions. 18
Justice
Brandeis, joined by Justice Holmes, opened his dissent by
characterizing the prosecution as an attack on the Socialist
party itself. "What is called 'distributing literature' is a means
commonly used by the Socialist party to increase its membership and otherwise to advance the cause it advocates," he
wrote. 19 The ultimate goal of the prosecution was to suppress
the freedom of an expressive association, not of individuals.
Other Espionage Act cases involved
similar conspiracy charges
20
aimed at associational activity.
Even where the government prosecuted a lone individual,
instead of a group of defendants, its real aim seems to have
14. Act of June 15, 1917, ch. 30, tit. I, § 3, 40 Stat. 219 (repealed 1948).
Federal authorities prosecuted approximately 2,000 cases charging Espionage
Act violations, which carried a penalty of fines of $10,000, up to twenty years
in prison, or both. See GOLDSTEIN, supra note 13, at 108-13.

15. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
16. Id. at 51.
17. 252 U.S. 239, 240-42 (1920).
18. Id. at 252-53.
19. Id. at 253 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
20. See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 623-24 (1919) (affirming
convictions of defendants, part of a group of anarchist Russian immigrants, for
conspiring to curtail production of armaments necessary to the war effort by
writing and distributing thousands of leaflets condemning U.S. military intervention in Russia following the 1917 Revolution); Frohwerk v. United States,
249 U.S. 204, 205-10 (1919) (affirming convictions of defendants, part of a
group German sympathizers, for conspiring to violate the Act by printing and
circulating a newspaper containing articles critical of the war).
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been to suppress the expressive activity of a group whose message it disdained. In Debs v. United States, the government
charged that Eugene Debs had violated the Act by criticizing
the war and the draft in a speech delivered, according to the
indictment, "to an assembly of people" at the Ohio Socialist
Party Convention.2 1 Debs, aware of the ongoing prosecutions
under the Act, had intimated in his speech to the convention
that he could not say everything he wanted to say about the
war. Of course, even this act of self-censorship was not enough
to save him from prosecution. Government had succeeded in
circumscribing what could be said at a political convention, the
prototypical expressive association. The chill on associational
freedom had set in.
2. Criminal Syndicalism
By the period immediately after the Russian Revolution,
two-thirds of the states had enacted criminal syndicalism and
criminal anarchy laws aimed at dismantling left-wing organizations. 22 These laws generally made it a crime to teach or advocate the overthrow of government by force, a tenet of revolutionary socialism and communism.
In practice, this meant ongoing state harassment of leftwing organizations. In Gitlow v. New York,2 3 the defendant
was a Socialist Party member convicted under New York's
criminal anarchy statute. His crime? He served on a party
committee charged with developing an organizational "Manifesto." He was also the business manager of the party's newspaper, which published the party "Manifesto" advocating "revolutionary mass action."24
An even more obvious state attack on expressive association came in Whitney v. California,25 which affirmed the conviction of Anita Whitney for violating a state criminal syndicalism
statute.26 The statute prohibited a person from "knowingly be21.

249 U.S. 211, 212 (1919); see also Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325,

332-33 (1920) (affirming conviction of defendant, manager of the organization
department of the Nonpartsian League, for giving an anti-war and antigovernment speech at a meeting of the League in violation of a state law similar to the Espionage Act).
22. For a discussion of this development, see ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, FREE
SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 141-68 (1941).

23.
24.
25.
26.

268 U.S. 652 (1925).
Id. at 657.
274 U.S. 357 (1927).
Id. at 372.
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comfing] a member of, any organization, society, group or assemblage of persons organized or assembled to advocate, teach
or aid and abet [criminal syndicalisml," 2 7 which was defined as
teaching the violent "change in industrial ownership or control
or effecting any political change."2 8 Thus, the statute was tailor-made to outlaw the Socialist Party without directly doing
SO.
Where prior decisions had at least involved prohibited
speech by the defendant himself, Whitney was punished for
mere membership in a group. In his famous concurrence in the
case, Justice Brandeis noted the startling attack on expressive
association. "The novelty in the prohibition introduced," he
wrote, "is that the statute aims, not at the practice of criminal
syndicalism, nor even directly at the preaching of it, but at associationwith those who preach it."29
3. The Smith Act
When the Cold War began, governmental authorities took
various steps to harass the Communist Party in the United
States. Prominent among these measures were prosecutions
under the Smith Act of 1940, which made it a crime "to organizeO or help[ ... to organize any society, group, or assembly of
persons" who teach the violent overthrow of government "or [to]
become a member of, or affiliate U with, any such society, group,
or assembly of persons." 30 Though federal law did not explicitly
outlaw the Communist Party until 1954, the Smith Act had the
practical effect of doing so.

27. Criminal Syndicalism Act of California, § 2, pt. 4, 1919 Cal Stat. 281
(codified at Cal. Pen. Code §§ 11400-11402) (repealed 1991) (emphasis added).
For a fuller discussion of Whitney's life and trial, see Blasi, The FirstAmendment and the Ideal of Civic Courage:The Brandeis Opinion in Whitney v. California, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 653 (1988).
28. Criminal Syndicalism Act of California, § 1.
29. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 373 (Brandeis, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
The Court reversed a conviction under a state criminal syndicalism statute in
De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937), noting that the "right of peaceable
assembly is a right cognate to those of free speech and free press and is
equally fundamental." Id. at 364.
30. Smith Act of 1940, § 2(3) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1994)) (emphasis added). Other federal legislation similarly targeted expressive association.
See, e.g., Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, tit. I, §§ 7-8 (codified at 50
U.S.C. § 781) (repealed 1993) (requiring certain organizations to register with
the Attorney General and to disclose internal information, including membership lists); Communist Control Act of 1954, 50 U.S.C. §§ 841-44 (outlawing the
Communist Party).
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In Dennis v. United States, the Court affirmed the Smith
Act convictions of the leaders of the Communist Party U.S.A.
(CPUSA).3 1 After a nine-month trial resulting in a 16,000 page
record, including detailed examination of the most minute details of internal party organization and literature, the trial
court found "the Communist Party is a highly disciplined organization," that it is "rigidly controlled" and "tolerate[s] no
dissension" from its members, and that "the literature of the
Party and the statements and activities of its leaders... advocate... a successful overthrow of the existing order by force
and violence." 32 It did not matter that the leaders had taken no
practical steps to accomplish this ambitious goal. "It is the existence of the conspiracy which creates the danger," the Court
33
held.
4. The Civil Rights Era
As First Amendment jurisprudence became more skeptical
of suppression of even subversive ideas, state efforts to contain
dissident groups turned away from direct regulation of group
speech and toward regulation of group organization. This shift
allowed the state to assert that the subject regulation was not
infringing free-speech rights at all, while effectively accomplishing the same goal. So, in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, the first decision explicitly recognizing a First Amendment right to freedom of association, Alabama sought to
require the NAACP to produce its membership list, not to punish it directly for its message. 34 Compliance with the order, as I
will discuss in more detail below, 35 would have seriously impaired the civil-rights group's ability to organize in a hostile
state in the South at the height of the Civil Rights movement.
That consequence, of course, was the very point of seeking the
membership list. Other cases have involved similar statesupported harassment of expressive associations working for
36
civil rights.
31.

341 U.S. 494, 516-17 (1951).

32. Id. at 498.
33. Id. at 511 (emphasis added).
34. 357 U.S. 449, 451 (1958).
35.

See infra Part II.C.4.

36. See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982) (involving state tort law directed at stopping NAACP's efforts to organize black
boycott of white merchants accused of racism); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415
(1963) (involving state law prohibiting solicitation of litigation directed at
stopping NAACP's efforts to end public school segregation).
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Viewed in the light of the history discussed above, the canonical "free speech" cases are really cases where the state
sought to infringe the freedom of expressive association.
Though the target changed-in some times and places, the target was the Socialist Party,37 in others it was the NAACP 38 or
the Ku KluxKlan 39-the goal of putting the screws on an expressive association troubling to state authorities was the
same. The state is not nearly as concerned with a Eugene Debs
who spouts radical ideas to his mirror or even to random
passersby in the park as it is with the same Eugene Debs who
shares his ideas with a group of like-minded folk at a meeting.4O
Of course, to the extent a Eugene Debs is saying anything
harmful at all, the danger is greater when he is saying it to a
group pre-disposed to agree with him than when he says it to
himself or to strangers. So the state's interest in regulation in
such cases, to the extent it is a legitimate interest, is more
likely compelling. The point is, the state recognizes this fact
and accordingly concentrates on suppressing organizations, and
often only instrumental individuals, that it views as a threat.

B. ExPRESSIVE ASSOCIATION,

STATE REGULATION, AND THE

RISE OF GAY EQUALITY

The First Amendment created gay America. For advocates
of gay legal and social equality there has been no more reliable
and important constitutional text. The freedoms it guarantees
have protected gay cultural and political institutions from state
regulation designed to impose a contrary vision of the good life.
Gay organizations, clubs, bars, politicians, journals, newspapers, radio programs, television shows-all these would be
swept away in the absence of a strong First Amendment.
The First Amendment, evenhanded and detached from
passions to an unusual degree for a jurisprudence, sheltered

37. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 359 (1927).

38. Patterson,357 U.S. at 551.
39. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 445 (1969) (reversing conviction of
a Ku Klux Klan member prosecuted under the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism
statute).
40. That's not to say the state is unconcerned with the speech of isolated
individuals, see, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-08 (1940) (reversing conviction of individual member of Jehovah's Witnesses for inciting a
breach of the peace), though even here the state's concern with dissident sects
is often evident.
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gays even when most of the country thought they were not just
immoral, but also sick and dangerous. 4 1 In an era of
almost
unrelenting hostility, William Eskridge has written, "the right
to associate was an appealing normative argument in both the
political and judicial arenas." 42 The shelter, afforded by this
right allowed gays to organize for the purpose of accumulating
and applying political power, a precondition for the effective
exercise of other important liberties. For gay America, it truly
43
is the FirstAmendment.
By contrast, the Due Process Clause (in its substantive dimension) has been faithless.44 The Equal Protection Clause
has been impotent. 45 The Ninth Amendment has been missing
41. As of 1967, two-thirds of Americans reported they looked upon homosexuals with "disgust, discomfort, or fear." CHARLES KAISER, THE GAY METROPOLIS 162 (1997) (based on a poll conducted by CBS News and presented
on national TV during a special report, "The Homosexuals," which aired
March 7, 1967). Homosexuality was listed as a mental disorder by the American Psychiatric Association until 1973. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & NAN D.
HUNTER, SEXUALITY, GENDER, AND THE LAw 186 (1997).
42. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID
OF THE CLOSET 114 (1999).
43. I am hardly alone in recognizing the centrality of the First Amendment to the struggle for gay equality. See id. at 111 (concluding that "the
main legal protections [for the developing institutions of early gay subculture]
were the first amendment's rights to associate, publish, and speak" and that
"first amendment litigation was relatively successful"); H.N. Hirsch, Levels of
Scrutiny, the FirstAmendment, and Gay Rights, 7 LAW & SEXUALITY 87, 100
(1997) ("Danger to our [gay] world, for the most part, did not come from laws
outlawing sexual acts. Instead, the danger came from censorship and cultural
repression. In cultural and social space protected by the First Amendment, I
discovered a way of life and a community, rather than how to subvert the sodomy laws ....
").
44. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190-96 (1986) (upholding constitutionality of sodomy law as applied to same-sex conduct).
45. In contrast to the treatment of race- and sex-based classifications under the Equal Protection Clause, federal courts do not currently apply heightened scrutiny to legislative classifications aimed at gays. The one appellate
panel decision applying strict scrutiny to sexual orientation discrimination
was vacated en banc. Watkins v. U.S. Army, 847 F.2d 1329, 1352-53 (9th Cir.
1988) (holding unconstitutional the U.S. Army's exclusion of homosexuals),
vacated en banc by 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989). The Supreme Court has not
decided the question whether gays are a suspect class under Equal Protection
analysis or whether sexual orientation discrimination might properly be analyzed as a form of sex discrimination justifying intermediate scrutiny under
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 199-210 (1976). In Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S.
620, 626-36 (1996), the Court used rational basis scrutiny to invalidate a state
constitutional amendment forbidding state and local officials from enacting or
enforcing policies protecting gays from discrimination. Though Evans did not
formally decide the level of scrutiny applicable to sexual orientation discrimination, it may suggest the Court will look especially closely at state action tar-
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in action.46 And the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges and
Immunities Clause has not been seen since it was banished at
the age of five.47
In its procedural dimension, the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause is the First Amendment's only serious constitutional competitor for pride of place in assisting gay equality advocates. The criminal procedure protections guaranteed
by the Due Process Clause have been powerful weapons against
state prosecutions of gay people for a variety of criminal offenses, including the violation of sodomy laws. 48 The Fourth
Amendment also deserves an honorable mention for preventing
police from barging into private
gay spaces, such as homes,
49
without sufficient justification.
Yet even these protections did not significantly reduce arrest rates of gay people for consensual sexual crimes "until gay
politicalpower forced police departments to consider their interests."50 The development of gay political power, however,
has depended in the first instance on the liberty of gays to organize in groups free of state regulation impinging on their internal affairs, including the content of their message and the
composition of their membership. This freedom, in turn, depends on a strong and principled First Amendment committed
to protecting unpopular opinion.
It took awhile to get to that point, however. Even as state
authorities from the 1920s through 1960s harassed dissident
political and civil-rights organizations, 51 they did the same to
nascent gay associations. A detailed exposition of gay organi-

geting gays, even if that close look comes under the guise of rational basis review. On the other hand, the unusual sweep of the law challenged in Evans
may limit the holding to its facts.
46. Justice Goldberg started to sketch a role for the Ninth Amendment in
his concurring opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut,381 U.S. 479, 486-99 (1965)
(Goldberg, J., concurring). But the Court has done nothing with it.
47. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 78-83 (1872). Several valiant search parties have turned up little. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY,
DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 22-30, 98 (1980); Phillip B. Kurland, The Privileges or Immunities Clause: "Its Hour Come Round at Last"?, 1972 WASH. U.
L.Q. 405, 405-20.
48. ESKRIDGE, supranote 42, at 101-04.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 104 (emphasis added).
51. See supra Part I-A (discussing the history of the state-sponsored suppression of expressive associations).
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zations' encounter with state demands for conformity
is beyond
52
the scope of this essay. I will sketch it here briefly.
1. The Chicago Society for Human Rights
The experience of the earliest known gay-rights organization in the United States illustrates the destructive consequences of state intrusion into gay association. In 1924, a
small group of gay men in Chicago decided to organize an association that would work for gay civil rights. "One of our greatest handicaps was the knowledge that homosexuals don't organize," wrote a leader of the group, Henry Gerber, almost four
decades later.53 "Being thoroughly cowed, they seldom get together."54 The key to overcoming inequality, in the eyes of the
earliest organizers of the gay civil rights movement, was to
form groups devoted to that goal. It was, in short, to form expressive associations.
On December 10, 1924, the state of Illinois issued a charter
55
for a non-profit corporation, the Society for Human Rights.
The Society borrowed its name from a homosexual-rights group
in 1920s Germany, where the political and cultural climate was
arguably better for gays than in the United States. 56 Nowhere
explicitly referring to homosexuals, the charter stated that the
group's purpose was "to promote and to protect the interests of
people who by reasons of mental and physical abnormalities
57 It
are abused and hindered" in their pursuit of happiness.
promised "to combat the public prejudices against them by dissemination of facts according to modern science among intellectuals of mature age."5 8 The group pledged to comply with the
59
law and denied any desire to advocate the violation of it.

52. For an excellent discussion of the history of state regulation of gay associations, and the legal arguments gay advocates used in opposition to that
regulation, see ESKRIDGE, supra note 42, at 44-46, 74-80, 93-95, 111-16; see

also Brief Amicus Curiae of Gays and Lesbians for Individual Liberty In Support of Petitioners at 5-14, Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446 (2000)
(No. 99-699), available at 2000 WL 228588.
53. JONATHAN NED KATZ, GAY AMERICAN HISTORY: LESBIANS AND GAY
MEN IN THE U.S.A. 389 (1992).
54. Id.

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id. at 385.
Id. at 388.
Id. at 387.
Id.
Id.
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The Society for Human Rights was a classic expressive association. The group selected leaders and drew up a plan to
gain members and to achieve its goals, including elimination of
sodomy laws. Members wrote to legislators. They published a
newsletter called Friendship and Freedom to "keep the homo60
phile world in touch with the progress of our efforts." Significantly, the group adopted an exclusionary membership policy,
to join. Even bisexuals would be kept
allowing only gay men 61
out "for the time being."
Members knew they had long years of work ahead. 'Yet,"
Gerber wrote later, "I was will to slave and suffer and risk62losing my job and savings and even my liberty for the ideal." It
would not be long before his resolve was tested.
Within months, authorities learned of the organization's
existence. They quickly ordered the arrest of its leaders for
disorderly conduct. The police, without a warrant but with a
newspaper reporter in tow, arrested Gerber in his home at 2
a.m. They seized his typewriter, the literature of the Society,
his personal diaries, and his bookkeeping accounts. The predictable headline of the newspaper the next day was, "Strange
Sex Cult Exposed."63 At Gerber's arraignment, a social worker
read aloud from his diary-out of context-the words, "I love
and the presiding judge to
Karl."6 This caused the detective
"shudder[] over such depravity."65
One of the organization's leaders pled guilty to the disorderly conduct charge. Gerber, who had also been threatened
with a bogus federal obscenity charge for mailing Friendship
and Freedom, hired a lawyer. The disorderly conduct charge
against Gerber was dismissed because of the warrantless
search, and no obscenity charge was filed. It was a small victory.
On Gerber's way out of the courthouse, the detective who
investigated him sneered, "What was the idea of the Society for

60. Id. at 389.
61. Id. at 390. Compare the BSA's professed need to exclude gays, discussed infra in Parts II.C.2 to II.C.4.
62. KATZ, supra note 53, at 389.
63. Id. at 391.
64. Id. Compare Justice Stevens's misreading of the BSA's written materials, discussed infra in Part II.C.1.

65. KATZ, supra note 53, at 391.
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Human Rights anyway? Was it to give you birds the legal right
66
to rape every boy on the street?"
Gerber's personal diary was never returned. He was
promptly fired from his job at the post office, which advised him
by letter that he had been terminated for "conduct unbecoming
a postal worker."67 Although his attorney offered to sue to get
the job back, Gerber "had no more money for fees and took no
69
action."68 The litigation had financially ruined him.
The whole episode doomed the Society for Human Rights.
It would be a quarter of a century before gays would again form
an association explicitly dedicated to advancing their civil
rights.
2. Gay Expressive Association After 1950
Two fledgling gay-rights groups, the Mattachine Society
(mostly men) and the Daughters of Bilitis (DOB) (women),
formed in the 1950s. The FBI closely monitored their activities, beginning an internal security investigation of Mattachine
in 1953 and of DOB in 1959. Neither group, of course, represented a credible internal security threat. "Nonetheless," William Eskridge writes, "FBI agents infiltrated both organizations, archived their declarations and publications, reported
their meetings and activities, recruited informants, compiled
lists of members whom they could identify, and speculated on
the organizations' influence and future activities."7 0 Agents interviewed the staff of the Mattachine's publication, One, and
notified their employers. Group members resorted to using
pseudonyms to protect their identity. Similar monitoring and
harassment of gay groups by state and federal authorities occurred throughout the country.7 1 Police harassment and spying
72
on gay organizations continued into the 1970s.
State intrusion on gay expressive association took many
forms. Congress tried to revoke the Washington, D.C., Mattachine Society's license as an educational group on the ground
66. Id. at 392-93.
67. Id. at 393.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 392-93. Compare the Girl Scouts' decision, under pressure of
litigation, to relieve girls of the duty to recite faith in "God" in the Girl Scout
Oath. See infra note 166 and accompanying text.

70. ESKRIDGE, supra note 42, at 75.
71. Id. at 76.
72. Id. at 114.
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that government should not support association by people
whose acts were ungodly and illegal. The IRS initially refused
to grant tax-exempt status to groups that "promoted" homosexuality. States like Ohio, New York, and Florida (which
barred recognition of "organized homosexuality") disallowed the
articles of incorporation of gay rights groups on public policy
73
grounds.
3. The Freedom of Association and the Rise of Gay Equality
As the Court developed stronger protection for the freedom
of association of unpopular groups in the late 1950s,7 4 gay political organizations, bars, and other groups benefited. For example, courts overturned many state decisions to deny corporate status to gay groups, often on freedom of association
grounds. 75 The associational freedom shielding a group's membership list was extended to gay groups, even in the context of
private civil litigation.76 When public university administrators attempted in the 1970s and 1980s to deny school recognition and funding to gay student groups, their decisions were
almost invariably reversed by courts applying the freedom of
association precedents that had protected black civil-rights organizations from state harassment.
The reasoning in one especially influential freedom of association decision, Gay Students Organization of University of
New Hampshire v. Bonner,7 7 stands out:
The [Gay Student Organization's] efforts to organize the homosexual
minority, "educate" the public as to its plight, and obtain for it better
treatment from individuals and from the government thus represent
but another example of the associational activity unequivocally singled out for protection in the very "core" of association cases decided
by the Supreme Court.... Moreover, the activity engaged in by the
GSO [sponsoring social events for members] would be protected even

73. Id. at 114-15.
74. Two cases of particular importance in this regard were Yates v. United
States, 354 U.S. 298, 303-38 (1957) (reversing convictions of fourteen Communist Party members for conspiracy to violate the Smith Act), and NAACP v.
Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460-66 (1958) (protecting the
NAACP's membership list from compelled disclosure).
75. See, e.g., Aztec Motel v. State, 251 So. 2d 849, 854 (Fla. 1971); In re
Gay Activists Alliance v. Lomenzo, 293 N.E.2d 255 (N.Y. 1973) (per curiam).
76. Adolph Coors Co. v. Wallace, 570 F. Supp. 202, 207-10 (N.D. Cal.
1983) (denying discovery of gay group's membership list in civil litigation by
Coors).
77. 509 F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1974). For a collection of cases, see ESKRIDGE,
supra note 42, at 116 n.61.
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if it were not so intimately bound up with the political process, for "it
is immaterial whether the beliefs sought to be advanced by association pertain to political, economic, religious or cultural matters." 8

Bonner placed gays solidly inside the emerging First Amendment tradition protecting the freedom of association.
Even First Amendment freedom claims that have started
out protecting organizations hostile to gay equality have been
applied by courts to protect gays as well. In Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of University of Virginia,79 the Supreme Court
held that a public university could not refuse to give funds from
a student activities fee to a controversial student newspaper
espousing anti-gay views. Yet Rosenberger was soon applied by
a federal court to reverse the decision of another public university to deny funding to a gay student group. 80 Congress passed
the Equal Access Act of 198481 at the urging of social conservatives who wanted religious student groups to be able to meet on
public school grounds. Now the very same law, along with associational freedom claims, is being used by gay student groups
82
to secure access to public facilities.
Not surprisingly, gay political organizations, bars, and
other institutions have flourished since recognition of the freedom of association in the late 1950s. For example, by 1981,
83
80% of all public colleges had recognized gay student groups.
The Gay, Lesbian and Straight Education Network, which filed
an amicus brief against the associational freedom of the Boy
Scouts 84 and bitterly criticized the result in Dale,85 estimates
there are now 700 gay-straight student alliances in high
schools, 86 few of which would exist without strong protection for
associational liberty. The rise of gay equality and public visibility coincided-not coincidentally, however-with the rise of

78. Bonner, 509 F.2d at 660 (citing Patterson,357 U.S. at 460).
79.

515 U.S. 819, 828-37 (1995).

80. Gay Lesbian Bisexual Alliance v. Pryor, 110 F.3d 1543, 1550 (11th
Cir. 1997).
81. 20 U.S.C. § 4071 (1994).
82. Brief Amicus Curiae of Gays and Lesbians for Individual Liberty In
Support of Petitioners at 13-14, Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446
(2000) (No. 99-699), available at 2000 WL 228588.
83. ESKRIDGE, supra note 42, at 116.

84. Brief of Amicus Curiae PFLAG & GLSEN, Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale,
120 S. Ct. 2446 (2000) (No. 99-699), availableat 2000 WL 339886.
85. See supra note 2.
86. Harriet Barovick, Fearof a Gay School, TIME, Feb. 21, 2000, at 52.
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vigorous protection for First Amendment freedom, especially
the freedom of association.
II. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSIVE ASSOCIATION AND
ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAW: THE DANGER OF A
MESSAGE-BASED APPROACH
The BSA decided to exclude James Dale, an Eagle Scout,
as a scoutmaster when it learned he was gay. Dale sued, losing
in the trial court, but ultimately winning in the New Jersey
Supreme Court. In the state court litigation, the BSA asserted
that it is not a "public accommodation" under New Jersey law
and that, even if it is, the First Amendment's guarantee of
freedom of association made application of the law to the BSA
in this instance unconstitutional. The first of these arguments
was unavailable to the BSA when it reached the United States
Supreme Court, but the second argument remained very much
87
alive.
Even as the Supreme Court has begun to articulate a freedom of association, protecting at least some private associations
from some state regulation, federal and state governments
have expanded the reach of laws against various kinds of discrimination, regulating more and more private associations in
more and more ways. Negotiating the appropriate constitutional boundary between protected association and permissible
anti-discrimination law is a challenge for the First Amendment. This Part will contrast the approaches of the majority
and the dissent in Dale, with special emphasis on a critique of
the dissenters' approach to the problem. Part III will suggest
an approach that both explains the Court's decisionmaking in
this area and offers a guide to the future.
A. THE FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION MEETS THE CITIZENSHIP
MODEL OF ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAW

The stakes are high. On the one hand, there is a strong
individual and social interest in giving citizens access to full
citizenship, especially economic opportunity. For many groups
of citizens, such access has either been denied altogether or seriously curtailed by irrational discrimination. This denial robs
the individual of a fair chance to succeed in life and robs everybody else of the benefits of that person's success. Concern with

87. Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2447-50.
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these consequences led Congress to adopt the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 and subsequent measures, forbidding discrimination
based on race (and other characteristics) in private employment
and public accommodations like inns and restaurants. 88 States
have passed similar laws forbidding discrimination.8 9
On the other hand, there is-in addition to a constitutional
command-a strong individual and social interest in expressive
association. Alexis de Tocqueville observed that "in the most
democratic country on the face of the earth," that is, the country most committed to the principle of political equality, associations are paramount. 90 "Wherever, at the head of some new
undertaking, you see the Government in France, or a man of
rank in England," he wrote, "in the United States you will be
sure to find an association." 91 America, eschewing both statism
and aristocracy, turned to associations as centers of power
apart from government. 92 It was because America committed
itself to equality that associations were so prevalent and so
needed. On this view, equality and private association are
93
complementary, not antagonistic.
There has been antagonism, however. Equality advocates
soon concluded that guaranteeing access to employment and
traditional public accommodations was insufficient as a means
to give citizens a fair opportunity to participate in public life.
Access to places, like private membership organizations focused
on commercial matters, where deals are made and personal
contacts important to business are forged, also had to be guar96
anteed. 94 This gave us Roberts95 and Rotary International,
where the Court upheld, against freedom of association claims,
the application of state anti-discrimination law to the membership policies of private organizations. This focus on the need

88. Title VII, Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17
(1994).
89.
90.

See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 363.03(3) (2000).
2 ALEXIS DE TOcQUEvILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 107 (Henry

Reeve trans., Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1994) (1835).
91. Id. at 106.
92. See id. at 107-08.
93. Id. at 106-10.

94. See, e.g., N.Y. State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 5-6
(1988) (quoting findings of New York City Council in support of expanded public accommodations law).
95. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
96. Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537 (1987).
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for access to jobs and business contacts might be called the economic model of anti-discrimination law.
Going even further, some equality advocates argue that
citizens must have access to large or otherwise important organizations for reasons independent of any direct economic
benefit that might be derived by membership in them. First,
these organizations are seen as important centers of normformation where attitudes inimical to equality are perpetuated.9 7 Members then act upon these inegalitarian values to
the detriment of the very groups intended to be helped by antidiscrimination law. Access to these organizations will improve
the political and cultural, not just the economic, climate for disfavored groups. Second, denial of access to such organizations
marks members of these disfavored groups as inferior in 'a way
that handicaps their ability to participate in civic life. The idea
is to avoid placing badges of inferiority on classes of citizens by
virtue of their exclusion from socially-important organizations.
The BSA is unquestionably an important organization in
American history and culture, having been a rite of passage for
generations of maturing boys. Something like this notion must
have been behind what even the Dale dissenters recognized is
the unusually broad New Jersey public accommodations law
(unusually broad as interpreted by the New Jersey Supreme
Court, that is). 98 This citizenship model of anti-discrimination
law, whatever its merits, is nothing less than a plea to have
government impose its values on dissident citizens. 99
97. Hunter, supra note 4, at 1630-34.
98. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446, 2459 (2000) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (calling the law "more expansive" than "most similar state statutes"). "Public accommodation," as defined by the New Jersey statute, includes more than fifty types of places. N.J. STAT. ANN. §10:5-5. The law covers places typically thought of as public accommodations like restaurants and
retail shops. Id. But it also includes more intimate settings, like summer
camps and roof gardens. Id. The New Jersey Supreme Court read the statute
to include private membership organizations also. See Dale v. Boy Scouts of
Am., 734 A.2d 1196, 1219 (N.J. 1999), rev'd, 120 S. Ct. 2446 (2000).
99. It might be argued that the citizenship model of anti-discrimination
law does not impose state values on such groups, it merely encourages the
adoption of these values. There is something to be said for this response, since
even most advocates of the citizenship model presumably do not believe that
anti-discrimination law should directly force a group to promulgate a particular message it disagrees with by, for example, requiring the group to amend its
mission statement to reflect the policies of the anti-discrimination law. See,
e.g., Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2472 (Stevens, J., dissenting). However, as I argue in
Part H.C, regulation of a group's membership through anti-discrimination law
is often a substantial imposition on the group's message. So membership
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The Court in Dale noted the problem thus created. "As the
definition of 'public accommodation' has expanded from clearly
commercial entities, such as restaurants, bars, and hotels, to
membership organizations such as the Boy Scouts," wrote Chief
Justice Rehnquist for the majority, "the potential for conflict
between state public accommodations laws and the First
Amendment rights of organizations has increased." 10 0 If the
citizenship model of anti-discrimination law is not to overrun
the First Amendment, a line must be drawn.
B. THE DISSENTERS' MESSAGE-BASED APPROACH
Every member of the Court recognizes that, under appropriate circumstances, an organization may have an associational claim that exempts it from some regulation promoting
equality. 10 1 How do the dissenters, led by Justice Stevens, decide when the associational claim wins and when it loses?
1. The Categorization Analysis
The first step, all members of the Court agree, is to determine whether the organization fits within the protected category of an "expressive association." The Court gives this term a
very broad definition, encompassing associations that pursue
"'a wide variety of political, social, economic, educational, religious, and cultural ends.'" 10 2 It is "not reserved for advocacy
groups."1 0 3 The group merely need "engage in some form of expression, whether it be public or private." 10 4 The dissenters
take no issue with this formulation, which seems to include
many conceivable associations.10 5

regulation may accomplish indirectly what everyone agrees the state could not
do directly: it changes an association's message in the direction the state desires. In this sense, membership regulation may be a proxy for content regulation, deserving the strictest First Amendment scrutiny. See infra Part I1I.B.2.
100. Dale, 120 S.Ct. at 2456.
101. Id. at 2471 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Surely there are instances in
which an organization that truly aims to foster a belief at odds with the purposes of a State's anti-discrimination laws will have a First Amendment right
to association that precludes forced compliance with those laws.").
102. Id. at 2451 (quoting Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622 (1984)).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Though, as I argue in Part III, primarily commercial associations,
even if expressive in some respects, do not enjoy a general exemption from
compliance with anti-discrimination law.
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The definition does not encompass all groups, however.
For example, a bowling league, or similar recreational outfit,
would ordinarily not be an expressive association, since such a
league would not usually be committed to promoting causes,
advocating ideas, or instilling values in its members. 10 6 An ashallsociation for socializing-such as the patrons of a dance
10 7
would also not ordinarily be an expressive association.
Because the freedom of expressive association is not a freestanding First Amendment right, the key is that the group
must be engaged primarily in protected expression in order to
fall within the purview of the right. The Court has emphasized
that the freedom of expressive association does not protect all
human association with an expressive component. "It is possible to find some kernel of expression in almost every activity a
person undertakes-for example, walking down the street or
meeting one's friends at a shopping mall-but such a kernel is
not sufficient to bring the activity within the protection of the
First Amendment" 10 8
The dissenters in Dale did not dispute that the BSA is an
expressive association. This is a bigger concession than it first
appears because what makes the BSA an expressive association is not the political causes it pursues. It does not pursue
any, in the usual sense. What makes the BSA expressive is the
fact that it seeks to instill moral values in boys both through
spoken and written messages10 9 and through the tacit example
of adult scoutmasters.'1 0
2. The Message Analysis
The next step is to determine whether compliance with the
anti-discrimination law (in this case, forcing the group to admit
a member it does not want) intrudes on the group's expressive
106. Even if a small bowling league or similar group is not an expressive
association, it might qualify as an intimate association. Intimate associations
are also constitutionally protected from anti-discrimination law. Roberts, 468
U.S. at 620 (status as protected intimate association depends on analysis of a
group's "size, purpose, selectivity, congeniality, and other characteristics").
107. See City of Dallas v. Stanglin,'490 U.S. 19, 20-21 (1989) (upholding
the constitutionality of a city ordinance restricting age of patrons at a dance
hall).
108. Id. at 25.
109. For example, the Scout Oath teaches boys '[tlo help other people at all
times" and to be "physically strong, mentally awake, and morally straight."
Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2451-52.
110. Id. at 2452.
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activity.11 1 Whether it does so, in turn, depends on (1) whether
the group has a message contrary to the command of the antidiscrimination law (the "message analysis"), and (2) whether
compliance with the law will impair the group's message (the
"impairment analysis"). While the majority and the dissent
agree on this framework, they disagree sharply on its application in Dale.
The majority's approach on the message analysis was to
defer to the group's own assertions about the existence and
meaning of its message. It was enough that the BSA could
point to fairly vague passages in the Scout Oath and Scout Law
urging boys to be "morally straight" and "clean."1 12 In new millennium America, with its widely-varying attitudes about homosexuality, these sentiments standing alone could reasonably
be understood (1) to implicitly disapprove homosexuality (the
BSA's interpretation), (2) to implicitly approve homosexuality
(my interpretation), or (3) to be unconcerned with homosexuality (the dissent's interpretation). The majority concluded that a
group is the best interpreter of its own message, even if the in11 3
terpretation comes in the context of litigation.
The BSA's interpretation was also supported by other
statements and actions priorto the Dale litigation.1 14 These include, inter alia, a declaration that an openly gay person may
not be a Scout leader because "[w]e do not believe that homosexuality and leadership in Scouting are appropriate"; 15 the
BSA's dogged public defense, beginning in litigation battles in
the early 1980s, of its associational right to exclude gays; 116 and
a statement that "homosexual conduct is inconsistent with the
requirement.., that a Scout be morally straight and.., that a
Scout be clean in word and deed," concluding with a declaration

111. Id.
112. Id. at 2452-53.
113. Id. at 2453 ("We accept the Boy Scouts' assertion [contained in its
brief to the Court]. We need not inquire further to determine the nature of the
Boy Scouts' expression with respect to homosexuality.").
114. Id. (discussing internal policy statements and prior state court litigation by the BSA attempting to exclude gays).
115. Id. (quoting a 1978 position statement by the BSA President and the
Chief Scout Executive to the Boy Scouts' Executive Committee).
116. Id. (stating that the BSA's defense of its policy began in the 1980s and
culminated in Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of Boy Scouts of Am., 952 P.2d

218 (Cal. 1998)).
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that "homosexuals
do not provide a desirable role model for
Scouts." 117
It is significant that the Court relied on this additional evidence only to satisfy itself that the BSA's interpretation of its
message was "sincere." 118 It is clear the Court does not regard
the requirement that a group's belief be sincere as an invitation
to parse its message. It appears no more demanding here than
it does for the evaluation of the sincerity of the religious basis
for an exemption to a generally applicable law under the Free
Exercise Clause. 119 Courts are not to referee disputes over the
proper interpretation of an expressive association's beliefs any
more than they can act as "arbiters of scriptural interpreta120
tion."
The only question should be whether the organization's interpretation of its beliefs is offered in good faith. The sincerity
requirement would seem to be met unless there were evidence
the association was trying to mislead the Court, for example,
contemporaneous evidence showing the group does not really
believe what it asserts in court that it believes. 12 1 Given that
conclusion, it is hard to see how in future cases the message
analysis will be anything more than a formality. The expressive association will nearly always win on this point.
The dissent, by contrast, would not defer to the association
on the existence and meaning of its message. Moreover, it
would set the bar high: "At a minimum, a group seeking to prevail over an anti-discrimination law must adhere to a clear and

117. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting a 1991 policy statement issued after
Dale was terminated but before New Jersey amended its public accommodations law to prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation and before
litigation commenced).
118. "[W]e look to it [evidence of the BSA's view about homosexuality] as
instructive, if only on the question of the sincerity of the professed beliefs." Id.
119.

Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981) ("The narrow function

of a reviewing court in this context is to determine whether there was an appropriate finding that petitioner... [had] an honest conviction that [compliance with state law] was forbidden by his religion."); Presbyterian Church v.
Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 450
(1969) (stating that courts must not decide matters "at the very core of a religion-the interpretation of particular church doctrines and the importance of
those doctrines to the religion").
120. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 716.
121. To challenge the association's sincerity, it would not be enough to
show the group had a different view on the issue in the past, since groups are
free to change their messages.
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unequivocal view." 122 This standard requires courts to scrutinize very closely a group's written and other statements. It is
not enough that a group's interpretation of its message be a
reasonable one; it must be clearly supported from the group's
own past statements. 123 Even if these past statements are clear
in some places, moreover, that is still not enough; the statements must not be contradicted elsewhere, lest they create fatal equivocality. 124 The dissent would require very close attention to the substance of a group's message.
Using this standard, the dissent carefully scrutinized the
BSA's written materials-including its mission statement, its
federal charter, the Scout Oath, the Scout Law, the Boy Scout
Handbook, the Scoutmaster Handbook, an internal 1978 policy
statement from the BSA's president, and four policy statements
issued between 1991 and 1993-to determine whether the BSA
really had a message about homosexuality. 125 The dissent
found, in one after another of these statements, either complete
silence or equivocation on the subject of homosexuality. As to
the proper interpretation of the Scout Oath and Scout Law, the
dissent confidently concluded, "It is plain as the light of day
that neither one of these principles---'morally straight'
and
'clean'--says the slightest thing about homosexuality." 126
3. The Impairment Analysis
Although the majority framed the impairment analysis in
fairly strict terms-asking whether compliance with the antidiscrimination law would "significantly affect" the group's "ability to advocate public or private viewpoints"127-the analysis is
a sheep in wolfs clothing. The majority held, "As we give deference to an association's assertions regarding the nature of its
expression, we must also give deference to an association's view
1 28
of what would impair its expression."
The Court noted that Dale was not only openly gay, but
was a leader in the gay community, having been copresident of
a gay organization in college, and was still a "gay rights activ122. Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2465 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
123. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (describing the BSA's inconsistent past
statements regarding homosexuality).
124. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
125. See id. at 2460-66 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
126. Id. at 2462 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
127. Id. at 2452.
128. Id. at 2453.
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ist."129 "Dale's presence in the Boy Scouts would, at the very
least, force the organization to send a message, both to the
youth members and to the world, that the Boy Scouts accepts
homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior." 130 The
Court argued this would be analogous to forcing the organizers
of the St. Patrick's Day parade to include a contingent of openly
gay marchers, something the Court unanimously refused to do
13 1
in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group.
The dissent had no trouble dismissing the notion that
Dale's presence would impair any BSA message since "the
group itself is unable to identify its own stance with any clarity."132 The dissent distinguished Hurley on the grounds that
Dale's participation "sends no cognizable message to the Scouts
or to the world."133 As for the possibility that the presence of
openly gay scoutmasters would send a message to the boys contrary to the BSA's desired message, the dissent argued that the
BSA teaches nothing about sexuality in general or homosexuality in particular. 134 In fact, the BSA cautions scoutmasters to
avoid the topic altogether. 135 Further, the dissent concluded

that because the BSA includes up to one million adult scoutmasters, and some of those scoutmasters do not view homo-

sexuality as immoral, there is little chance that admission of an
openly gay person would send any message to the outside

129. Id. at 2454. A future litigant who was openly gay but not a "gay rights
activist" might argue that Dale does not extend to him. It remains to be seen
whether, in litigation claiming violation of an anti-discrimination law, the
Court would permit the exclusion of someone who was known to be gay but
was not politically active. That question is open after Dale. But the line between being "actively" openly gay (OK to exclude, after Dale) and "passively"
openly gay (not OK to exclude) would be awfully hard to draw with precision
or principle. For that reason alone, it is doubtful the Court will attempt it.
Another question left open by Dale is whether its rationale would apply to
the exclusion of an openly gay scout, rather than a scoutmaster. Scoutmasters
have a much more important role in promulgating the BSA's moral views than
do scouts themselves. Nevertheless, it doubtful the Court would draw the line
here since many of the associational concerns implicated by the New Jersey
law, discussed infra Part II.C, apply to the forced inclusion of openly gay
scouts.
130. Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2454 (emphasis added).
131. 515 U.S. 557, 574-75 (1995).
132. Dale, 120 S.Ct. at 2470 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
133. Id. at 2475 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
134. See id. at 2470 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that the BSA's mission statement, federal charter, official membership policy, Scout Oath, and
law are all "devoid of any view on the topic [of homosexuality]").
135. See id. at 2472 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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"[the]
Boy Scouts of
world. 136 "In short," wrote Justice Stevens, 13
7
America is simply silent on homosexuality."
C. FLAWS IN A MESSAGE-BASED APPROACH
The insistence that a group's message must be "clear and
unequivocal" before it is entitled to First Amendment protection is flawed for four principal reasons. First, by requiring
clarity and unequivocality, the approach asks too much of
speech, which is often ambiguous and even equivocal. The approach will be likely systematically to punish unpopular opinion-the very danger the First Amendment seeks to avoidbecause doubt about a group's message will often be resolved
against such opinion. There is evidence of this bias in the dissent's own interpretation of the BSA's message. Even assuming an impartial decisionmaker, however, unpopular opinion
will suffer disproportionately under the dissent's approach because associations with controversial opinions often speak ambiguously and equivocally in order to protect themselves from
popular backlash. Second, the approach misses the way in
which membership itself says something about the group to
both its internal and external audiences. The presence of an
openly gay person, in particular, speaks powerfully to the
group's members and to the outside world. Third, the approach
misses the subtlety of speech, especially the way in which a
group can "speak" about a subject by insisting on silence about
that subject. This is especially true of the subject of homosexuality. Finally, the approach improperly dismisses the practical
needs of a group to avoid the organizational harm that would
be done by compliance with a state regulation. It was just this
type of harm-not the need to preserve a message-that gave
birth to the freedom of association in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.
Harrison.
1. A Message-Based Approach Is Unrealistic, Error-Prone,
and Dangerous to Unpopular Opinion
Speech is painting a picture, not doing a sum. 138 Words
and groups of words have many and often indeterminate mean-

136. See id. at 2476-77 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 2470 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
138. "Life is painting a picture, not doing a sum." Oliver Wendell Holmes,
Address at Fiftieth Anniversary of Graduation, The Class of '61 (June 28,
1911), in THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES 94 (Richard Posner ed., 1992).
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ings that depend on hard judgments about context and emphasis. Often more than one reasonable interpretation of a literary
or political work is possible. As any student of the Uniform
Commercial Code knows, even very smart people, trained in
the art of using language with precision, trying to say things as
plainly as possible, miss their mark. Aiming to satisfy the
needs of one moment, they fail to anticipate the next. Aiming
to handle future problems, they overlook the present. Aiming
to resolve a particular issue, they contradict their resolution of
another. Aiming to deal with all dilemmas, they speak so
broadly they settle none. This is not just a "fault" of human
communication. It is also what makes it rich and beautiful and
fun.
Unlike code drafters, people often speak in order to obfuscate, not to illuminate; in order to compromise a web of conflicting interests, not to clear them out. Understanding the speech
of a group trying to transmit moral values without unnecessarily offending or hurting people is not like understanding a tax
code. To qualify for First Amendment protection, then, groups
have not even been required to have written materials, much
less clearly written materials.
Recognizing the opaque quality of human expression, the
Supreme Court has never required clarity as a precondition for
First Amendment protection. 39 It protects even symbolic expression, like wearing a black armband 140 or displaying a red
flag,'4 ' whose thrust may be apparent but whose meanings may
be difficult to discern with precision. "[A] narrow, succinctly
articulable message is not a condition of constitutional protection," wrote Justice Souter (a Dale dissenter) for a unanimous
Court in Hurley, "which if confined to a 'particularized message'
would never reach the unquestionably shielded painting of
Jackson Pollock, music of Arnold Schoenberg, or Jabberwocky
142
verse of Lewis Carroll."
Yet, consuming several pages of close textual analysis, the
dissent approaches the BSA's views as a judge might approach
the interpretation of a complex statutory scheme. To deter139. The dissent cites no authority for its clarity standard, which appears
to have been concocted for this case.
140. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504
(1969).
141. See Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369 (1931).
142. Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557, 569
(1995) (citation omitted).
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mine whether the BSA's message possesses the requisite clarity, the dissent implicitly relies on some familiar principles and
canons of statutory construction: for example, words should be
interpreted in light of their underlying purpose, 143 read a statute in its entirety, 1" discern the intent of the framers, 145 the
specific provision controls the general, 146 and the more recent
provision controls the earlier. 147 Omitting only expressio unius,
the dissent barely escapes lapsing into Latin.
Part of the problem with the dissent's clarity requirement
is that judicial decisionmakers will often draw the wrong conclusions, as the dissent does, about a group's beliefs. Though
there are many examples of error about the BSA's beliefs in the
dissent, consider just three.
First, the dissent was unconvinced by the BSA's claim that
the words "morally straight" and "clean" reflect disapproval of
homosexual conduct. Turning to other uses of these words in
BSA materials distributed to boys, the dissent noted that sexuality is not mentioned specifically. 148 The dissent also noted
these terms refer to many things, such as a duty to be kind to
others and to be honest. 149 Based on these observations, the
dissent confidently concluded, "It is plain as the light of day
that neither one of these principles--'morally straight' and
150
'clean'-says the slightest thing about homosexuality."
Since when? For much of American history words like
"moral" and "clean" have been freighted with far more meaning
143.

Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446, 2462 (2000) (Stevens, J.,

dissenting) ("In light of BSA's self-proclaimed ecumenism... it is even more
difficult to discern any shared goals or common moral stance on homosexuality.").
144. Id. at 2463 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("But when the entire 1978 letter
is read, BSA's position is far more equivocal ....
").
145. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[It is apparent that the draftsmen of the
[1978] policy statement foresaw the possibility that laws against discrimination might one day be amended to protect homosexuals from employment discrimination.").
146. Id. at 2463-64 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that the 1978 policy
statement excluding homosexuals from the BSA "clearly provided that, in the
event such a law conflicted with their policy, a Scout's duty to be 'obedient' and
'obe[y] the laws,' even if 'he thinks [the laws] are unfair' would prevail in such
a contingency").
147. Id. at 2465 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("[While the 1991 and 1992
statements tried to tie BSA's exclusionary policy to the meaning of the Scout
Oath and Law, the 1993 statement abandoned that effort.").
148. Id. at 2461 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
149. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
150. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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than the duty to help elderly people cross the street. In most
places for much of American history, homosexual conduct has
not been considered "morally straight." Gay people have often
been seen as dirty and sick-the very opposite of being "clean"
in "body and mind," as the BSA urges boys to be. Though attitudes toward gays are improving, much resistance remains. 15 1
Surely the Boy Scouts are entitled to use familiar terms with
this common background meaning in mind. Even if that meaning is increasingly contested, as it should be, the BSA must be
permitted to defend its traditional interpretation of these words
in the culture wars.
Second, the dissent declared it is not enough that a group
have an exclusionary membership policy in order to prevail on
an associational claim against an anti-discrimination law; it
must also tie that exclusionary policy to some belief the group
holds. The BSA pointed to two policy statements issued in
1991 and one statement issued in 1992 that did exactly that,
explicitly declaring that homosexual conduct is inconsistent
with being "morally straight" and "clean."152 One would have
thought this would satisfy the dissent's clarity requirement.
Instead, the dissent complains that the BSA "abandoned" its
interpretation of "morally straight" and "clean" by failing to repeat it in a subsequent policy statement issued in 1993. The
1993 statement explained only that excluding gays as scoutmasters reflected "the expectations that Scouting families have
had for the organization" and that "homosexuals [do not] provide a role model consistent with these expectations."153
It is hard to see how this position "abandons" the view that
homosexual conduct is inconsistent with being "morally
straight" and "clean." Indeed, it seems implicitly to reinforce it.
So the dissent appears to require not just that a group have a
clearly expressed view, but that the view be reiterated in every
statement the group makes thereafter lest the court find it has
been abandoned. Perhaps the dissent is applying expressio
unius to group speech after all.

151. A majority of Americans still believe homosexual conduct is morally
wrong. Carey Goldberg, Tolerance for Gays Up, Study Says, HOUSTON
CHRON., May 31, 1998, at A4 (noting that although disapproval of homosexuality had dropped nearly 20% since its peak in the 1980s, a 1996 study still
showed a 56% disapproval rate).
152. Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2464 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
153. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).

1546

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 85:1515

Third, the dissent chided the majority for quoting selectively from a 1978 letter from the BSA president to the executive board declaring that the BSA does "not believe that homosexuality and leadership in Scouting are appropriate." 54 In
response to a question about whether openly gay adult members should be excluded, the statement declared, 'Yes, in the
absence of any law to the contrary.... In the event that such a
law was applicable, it would be necessary for the Boy Scouts of
155
America to obey it."
The dissent takes this to mean the BSA
intended to exclude gays unless a state enacted an antidiscrimination law prohibiting discrimination against gays. It
is more plausible to conclude that BSA meant to exclude gays
unless an anti-discrimination law applicable to the BSA required otherwise. Yet if the state's anti-discrimination requirement is unconstitutional as applied to the BSA's membership policy, it is not truly "applicable" to the BSA. The whole
point of the Dale litigation was to test that proposition. It is
not necessary for the BSA to obey unconstitutional laws, nor is
it plausible to suggest the group would consent to doing so.
Thus, the dissent takes a simple and unsurprising promise to
behave lawfully and turns it into a surrender of constitutional
rights.
The danger of a message-based approach is not only that
quibbling judges (or juries) will misunderstand a group's message. It is that, in doing so, they will systematically disfavor
unpopular opinions. This will happen because of a common
human trait known as confirmation bias, the tendency to interpret subsequent words and events in a manner favorable to
one's initial conclusions. 56 Thus, decisionmakers who come to
a case convinced an unpopular view is wrong will be more
likely to interpret the purveyor's message unfavorably. That
57
result is antithetical to the idea of the First Amendment. 1
The systematic bias arising from a message-based approach to the problem of associational freedom would come
about in three ways. First, as an initial matter, dissident

154. Id. at 2463 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
155. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).
156. See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence,

51 STAN. L. REV. 1477, 1495 (1999) (describing confirmation bias).
157. Cf United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 87 (1944) ("If one could be
sent to jail because a jury in a hostile environment found those [religious]
teachings false, little indeed would be left of religious freedom.").
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groups 158 are the only ones that will be sued under an antidiscrimination law. By definition, only groups that are unpopular-in the sense that they are acting contrary to the legislative
majority's demands-will need to defend themselves. This
skews the sampling of opinion that will be subject to clarity re1 59
view.
Second, the clarity requirement will disproportionately impact dissident groups once they are in court. To escape public
censure, dissident groups often necessarily "speak" more secretively and evasively than do dominant groups. This was apparently the case with the BSA, which wanted to maintain its gay60
exclusion without shouting its views from the mountaintops. 161
Requiring the messages of these groups to be clear and public
is an unrealistic expectation and is therefore unfair. Further,
the backdrop of the state's strong social interests in eradicating
discrimination will add to pressure on decisionmakers to find
"ambiguity" or "equivocality" in the group's message to begin
with. Decisionmakers, acting on confirmation bias, will have
leeway to impose their own political preferences on groups
whose message they disdain. 162 Once this ambiguity, or some
internal contradiction, is found, the state will have its way.
The history of the state's attempts to regulate association by
investigating its speech 163 should counsel caution in this area.
Third, even if dissident groups survive clarity review and
thus win an exemption from compliance, they will have been
forced to bear the burden of expensive litigation in defending

158. By "dissident group" I mean not just groups that are generally unpopular, like the CPUSA in the 1950s, but also generally-approved groups that
have some controversial views. The BSA clearly fits in the latter category, not
the former. Similarly, the Catholic Church, while powerful and influential
generally, is a 'dissident" group in its opposition to the use of contraceptives.
159. Of course, this skewing problem will be present in every approach
since only groups alleged to run afoul of anti-discrimination law will be sued.
160. Reply Brief for Petitioners at 4, Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 120 S.Ct.
2446 (2000) (No. 99-699), available at 2000 WL 432367.
161. Among other objections, the dissent complains that the 1978 BSA policy statement on gays was never publicly promulgated. Dale, 120 S. Ct. at
2463 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
162. There are indications of such a bias against the BSA's views in Justice
Stevens's own dissent. Id. at 2477 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (describing "unfavorable opinions about homosexuals" as "atavistic" and as "prejudices" that
"have caused serious and tangible harm"). I share Justice Stevens's discomfort with the BSA's views about homosexuality, which is all the more reason
people like us should not be reviewing them.
163. See supra Part I.A.
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their views. 1M The BSA has been fighting litigation over its
gay exclusion for almost two decades, yet its views were still not
sufficiently clear and unequivocal for the New Jersey courts and
four members of the Supreme Court.165 The Girl Scouts gave up
their insistence that "God" be included in the Girl Scout Oath
at least in part because they could not afford protracted lawsuits.

16 6

Dissident expressive associations, already on the mar-

gins of majority opinion, are less likely than dominant groups
(or commercial associations) to have the economic and human
resources to fend off the state.167
In response to these risks, unpopular groups (or even
groups, like the BSA, that are generally popular but have some
controversial views touching on state anti-discrimination law)
will self-censor their messages. The net effect of a messagebased approach will be to punish the expression of unpopular
ideas the FirstAmendment exists to protect.
Of course, the dissent's strict clarity requirement is not the
only imaginable message-based approach. Instead of requiring
clarity and unequivocality in an expressive association's message, for example, one might require much less of the group. A

164. There will, of course, be litigation costs associated with the tripartite
approach suggested in Part III. But under the tripartite approach these costs
are less likely to be borne by the groups least equipped to bear themexpressive associations-and most likely to be borne by the groups more
equipped to bear them-commercial and quasi-expressive associations. See
supra text accompanying notes 327-28; cf Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va.
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 772 n.24 (1976) (noting that
commercial speech is more "hardy" than non-commercial speech). This is because expressive associations are almost absolutely protected from antidiscrimination under the tripartite approach and will need only litigate the
issue of their proper categorization as expressive. Further, as I argue in Part
III.B.4, the tripartite approach is more likely to settle into familiar and predictable rules over time than is a message-based approach, diminishing the
need for litigation and allowing associations to adjust their behavior according
to their principal interests, whether expressive or commercial.
165. The dissent ignores the BSA's prior litigation defending its gay exclusion. Apparently, for the dissent, advocacy in court is not a way of speaking.
Yet it is clear that litigation in defense of one's beliefs is a "mode[] of expression and association protected by the First [Amendment]." NAACP v. Button,
371 U.S. 415, 428-29 (1963) (upholding, against state anti-solicitation law, the
NAACP's right to solicit clients for civil rights lawsuits).
166. Reply Brief for Petitioners at n.4, Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 120 S. Ct.
2446 (2000) (No. 99-699), available at 2000 WL 432367.
167. See supra text accompanying notes 327-28. It cannot be maintained
that the BSA itself, however, was poor in economic and human resources. The
point is that many expressive associations fighting anti-discrimination law
will be poor in these resources.
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court could require only that the association's interpretation of
its message be reasonable-rather than that the message be
objectively clear and unequivocal-in order to get protection
from membership regulation by the anti-discrimination law.
This would certainly be less onerous than the dissent's standard. However, even this minimal substance requirement will
involve some risk to unpopular opinion. To the extent that a
lesser message-based standard requires a group to defend its
own interpretation of its message in litigation, it runs this risk.
To the extent it is just another way of deferring to the association on the meaning of its message, however, one wonders what
purpose it would serve.
Gays may fare well under a message-based approach in
places, like New Jersey, that have favorable public policy and
opinion to back them up. But gays will fare poorly under this
approach in other places. Imagine, for example, putting the
fate of a gay organization's internal organizational rules in the
hands of an elected judge in a state with an anti-gay sodomy
law. Consider the intrusive nature of discovery under which
judges and the group's enemies might examine the group's internal, confidential policy statements. Even if the group wins
on review, it may be bankrupted by the experience and thus effectively forced to change its policy or altogether driven out of
existence. Gay history teaches the danger to dissident speech
and organization that comes when the state is empowered to
pore over a group's internal documents and pressure it finan168
cially with even meritless claims.
2. A Message-Based Approach Ignores the Expressive
Component of Group Membership
The dissent rejects the notion that "Dale's mere presence
among the Boy Scouts will itself force the group to convey a
message about homosexuality." 169 Dale's attorneys went further, flatly asserting that "Dale's identity is not a message" and
suggesting that "declaring oneself to be gay communicates
[nothing] more than one's sexual orientation."170 These contentions miss the important way in which a group's membership
policy is itself expressive. They also ignore an important lesson
168. See supra Part I.B.1 (recounting experience of the Chicago Society for
Human Rights).
169. Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2474 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
170. Brief for Respondent at 31-32, Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 120 S. Ct.
2446 (2000) (No. 99-699), availableat 2000 WL 340276.
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of the gay civil rights experience, which teaches that coming
out of the closet is a profoundly expressive act affecting not
only the person who comes out but everyone around him.
A group's membership policy is itself a means of communicating its values, both internally and externally. 7 1 It says a
great deal to outsiders about the BSA's world view that the
group would have a policy excluding gays. The policy is, on the
one hand, an affirmation of traditional sexual morality. It is,
on the other, a reflection of concern about introducing youths to
sexuality at all. It is, further, a denial of the notion that gays
can be moral participants in civic life. It is, less charitably, a
message of personal revulsion, a denial of the basic humanity
and dignity of gay people. It is in part because the policy sends
such negative messages about a protected class that the state
wants to regulate the BSA's membership: the message the
membership policy sends runs counter to the state's goal, expressed in the citizenship model of anti-discrimination law, of
ensuring gays equal access to civic life.
Gay organizations themselves have historically discriminated in membership based on sexual orientation. From the
beginnings of the gay civil rights movement, gay organizations
have relied on exclusively gay environments in which to feel
safe, to build relationships, and to develop political strategy.
The Society for Human Rights, the first known gay civil rights
organization, excluded even bisexuals. Today, there are exclusively gay social clubs, retreats, vacations, music festivals, and
alumni and professional organizations. Even groups that are
not exclusively gay would resist having heterosexuals in lead17 2
ership positions.
It might be responded that every exclusionary membership
policy-whether based on race, sex, or sexual orientation-is

171. Roberts is consistent with this view. The Jaycees wanted to exclude
women as full voting members but had invited women to participate in much
of the group's training and community activities. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468
U.S. 609, 621 (1984). For that reason, the Court said the Jaycees' claim that
full membership for women would "impair a symbolic message" conveyed by
the exclusionary policy "is attenuated at best." Id. at 627. By contrast, the
BSA does not allow openly gay people to participate in any aspect of membership. The BSA's exclusionary policy, because it is more complete, is also more
expressive and more likely to be impaired by forced association than was the
Jaycees' policy.
172. Brief Amicus Curiae of Gays and Lesbians for Individual Liberty In
Support of Petitioners at 25, Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 120 S.Ct. 2446 (2000)
(No. 99-699), availableat 2000 WL 228588.
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expressive in just this way. That is true. It said a lot about a
business networking club, like the Rotary, that it attempted to
exclude women. The reason to deny the Rotary's associational
freedom claim, then, is not that excluding women sends no
message. After decades of feminist activism, the exclusion of
women from an association is often a very strong message of
group resistance to changing cultural173norms. The reason to
deny the Rotary's claim lies elsewhere.
Moreover, an exclusionary membership policy has special
message-bearing force in the area of sexual orientation, where
the expressive component of identity is even more distinct than
in the area of race or sex. It makes sense to speak of an "openly
gay person" in a way that it would not make sense to speak of
an "openly black person." Homosexuality is not an observable
personal trait, like skin color. To be known to others, one's homosexuality must be affirmatively communicated to them (either by the gay person himself or by those who know or believe
they know his sexual orientation), where a trait like race is not
"expressed" in this sense at all because it is passively communicated. 174 So one's status as openly gay is a form of communication. It is an ongoing affirmative statement from the gay person to the rest of the world. It is speech.
This is not a revolutionary view: it has been a central argument of gay rights advocates for decades. Coming out, in the
context of our society and times, is freighted with personal, cultural, and even political significance. It is not just a statement
of sexual orientation; it is ordinarily an affirmation that one is
unashamed about being gay, that others should not be
ashamed about it, that one intends to act sexually on the orientation, and that one is prepared to deal with the consequences
of being honest. A person who self-identifies as gay can rationally be expected to engage in homosexual conduct. Here, the
dissent's attempt to draw a bright line between Dale's status as
gay person (for which the dissent says the BSA could not exclude him) and his conduct (for which the dissent says the BSA
may exclude him) simply falls apart.
As Nan Hunter has written, "Self-representation of one's
sexual identity necessarily includes a message that one has not
173.

See infra Part

I.

174. It is true, of course, that some people can "pass" as a member of another race, requiring some affirmative "coming out" by them analogous to a
gay person's coming out. But this is the exception in the case of race; it is the
rule for gay people.
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merely come out, but that one intends to be out-to act on and
live out that identity."175 Others have argued that coming out
is pure speech, entitled to full First Amendment protection
from state regulation in contexts like the military. 176 Courts,
too, have recognized the expressive nature of coming out, 177 and
have even concluded that the First Amendment precludes the
state from discharging a public employee for doing so. 178 If, as
the dissent concedes, the BSA may exclude people who express
messages about homosexuality it does not want to have conveyed, 179 it may exclude people like Dale who necessarily "express" a message by virtue of being openly gay.
On this point, the Dale majority may have inadvertently
benefitted openly gay state and federal employees. By highlighting the impact Dale's being openly gay would have on the
BSA, the Dale majority implicitly accepts the expressive nature
of coming out. This should help the cause of state and federal
employees everywhere who are fired or otherwise disadvantaged on the job for coming out of the closet. After Dale, it
175. Nan D. Hunter, Identity, Speech, and Equality, 79 VA. L. REV. 1695,
1696 (1993) (emphasis added). But see James P. Madigan, Questioning the
Coercive Effect of Self-Identifying Speech 59 (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author) (criticizing Hunter's identity argument: "Nan Hunter does not
get to decide what any and every gay person means when he or she selfidentifies."). While I agree with Madigan's claim that self-identifying as gay
does not necessarily imply adherence to a particular ideological agenda, see id.
at 6, 1 think he misses the widely shared social understanding of what one
says by being out. Even if a particular out gay person does not intend to send
a gay-affirming message by being out, his self-identification will often be understood by others that way. This message is "received" even if not "sent," and
it is a message an expressive association should be able to avoid. Further,
even if the precise message sent by coming out varies from person to person,
there is no doubt that some message is sent. The claim for associational freedom is an effort by the group (in this case, the BSA) to avoid being associated
with any message tied to coming out.
176. David Cole & William N. Eskridge, Jr., From Hand-Holding to Sodomy: First Amendment Protection of Homosexual (Expressive) Conduct, 29
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 319, 321-22, 325, 337 (1993).
177. See, e.g., Gay Law Students Ass'n v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 595 P.2d
592, 610 (Cal. 1979) (interpreting a provision of state labor code prohibiting
discrimination based on employees' "political activity" to protect openly gay
people from discrimination).
178. Weaver v. Nebo Sch. Dist., 29 F. Supp. 2d 1279, 1288-89 (D.Utah
1998) (stating that the removal of a public high school teacher for acknowledging her homosexuality violated the First Amendment).
179. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 120 S.Ct. 2446, 2472 (2000) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (agreeing that Dale has no right to advocate gay civil rights "when
he is working as a Scoutmaster," and "BSA cannot be compelled to include a
message about homosexuality" if it prefers to remain silent).
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should be clear the act of coming out has First Amendment significance, as does a negative employment consequence arising
from that act.
Whatever the doctrinal significance of coming out, its practical impact cannot be doubted. The evidence, one might say, is
clear and unequivocal that it has a profound affect on the political views of the recipients of the message. A recent survey
by Harris Interactive concluded that "familiar voters"-those
with a known gay family member, friend, co-worker, or acquaintance-are far more likely than "non-familiar voters" to
support hate crimes legislation protecting gays (82% familiar
vs. 74% non-familiar), employment discrimination laws protecting gays (74% familiar vs. 58% non-familiar), allowing gays to
serve openly in the military (64% familiar vs. 46% nonfamiliar), legal recognition of same-sex civil unions (47% familiar vs. 22% non-familiar), and adoptions by gay parents (47%
familiar vs. 19% non-familiar).1 80 Familiar voters are also more
likely to consider these issues "important" in their voting decisions. 181 They are correspondingly less likely than non-familiar
voters to support a candidate who expresses negative views
about gays. 18 2 Thus, to deny the significance of Dale's being
openly gay in a Boy Scout troop is to deny substantial empirical
data and to deny a central lesson of gay experience.
Justice Stevens himself recognized the political and cultural effect of coming out. "Over the years," he wrote in closing,
"interaction with real people... [has] modified [anti-gay] opinions." 183 James Dale, too, understood the need to come out in
order to be a "role model" for gay youth. It is this role modeling, this subtle but deep effect on the personal opinions of its
members, in short this message, that the BSA sought to avoid
sending by excluding openly gay scoutmasters.
The dissent responds that if the BSA really wanted to
avoid sending a message of affirmation about homosexuality to
180. GILL FOUNDATION, OUT AND INTO THE VOTING BOOTH: LESBIAN, GAY,
BISExUAL & TRANSGENDER VOTERS IN 2000, at 27 (on file with author) [here-

inafter OUT AND INTO THE VOTING BOOTH]. Interestingly, public support for
gay equality among both familiar and non-familiar voters is highest in areas
related to crime prevention and job protection. That support declines as the
issues move closer to family life and especially to child-rearing. This finding
supports the notion that the BSA faced a serious backlash among its members
if it had been forced to admit openly gay scoutmasters. See infra Part II.C.4.
181.

OUTAND INTO THE VOTING BOOTH, supra note 180, at 52.

182. Id. at 53.
183. Dale, 120 S.Ct. at 2478 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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its boy members, it would also exclude heterosexual scoutmasters that disagree with its views about homosexuality. There
are two responses to this. First, if only to satisfy boys' parents,
the BSA would certainly not tolerate a heterosexual scoutmaster who actually conveyed a gay-affirming message to boys in
his charge.
Second, tolerating the presence of gay-friendly heterosexual scoutmasters is qualitatively different than tolerating the
presence of openly gay scoutmasters. A heterosexual may
make abstract arguments supporting a gay equality claim and
debate may ensue. But the moment a known gay person enters
the room abstractions end. An openly gay person forces those
around him to deal with their feelings about homosexuality in a
much more personal way. The disputants confront a person,
not just an argument. Arguments about "sodomy laws" become
discussions about whether this person should go to jail. Arguments about "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" become discussions about
whether this person is fit to serve his country. Arguments
about "traditional marriage" become discussions about whether
this person can marry the person he loves. And arguments
about civil rights laws become discussions about whether this
person should be fired or excluded. The whole dynamic changes
184
when an openly gay person is present.
Something similar to this realization has been behind the
effort of the gay civil rights movement to elect openly gay people to public office. 185 It has not been enough for gay-rights ad184. I appreciate the counterargument that a straight person arguing for
gay equality might be viewed as having more credibility on the subject than a
gay person making similar arguments because the gay person speaks out of
self-interest. Hunter, supra note 4, at 1602. In some contexts that is certainly
a persuasive argument. However, it is not persuasive in the case of scoutmasters whose actual statements to the boys, all concede, may be freely silenced
by the BSA. Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2472 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("Dale's right to
advocate certain beliefs in a public forum or in a private debate does not include a right to advocate these ideas when he is working as a Scoutmaster.").
The choice in the context of the BSA, then, is between the message sent by the
presence of a muzzled but gay-friendly straight person and the message sent
by the presence of a muzzled but openly gay person. I cannot believe anyone
would doubt in this context that the stronger message of gay-affirmation is
sent by the openly gay person; indeed, it is hard to understand how the muzzled straight scoutmaster sends any message at all. That is presumably why
the BSA considers it safe to include a muzzled (pro-gay) straight scoutmaster
but not a muzzled openly gay scoutmaster.
185. A prominent gay-rights organization, the Gay & Lesbian Victory
Fund, is devoted entirely to electing openly gay people of either major party to
public office.
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vocates to elect pro-gay straightpoliticians. Is there any doubt
that, everything else being equal, gay-rights advocates would
prefer to have an openly gay role model heading a scout troop
than a gay-friendly straight one? Gay advocates, and the BSA,
186
instinctively understand the difference.
Judges are likely to misunderstand or underappreciate, as
the dissent does, the significance behind the choices an expressive association makes about why to send one message rather
than another, or the meaning of the messages it sends, or how
to send the message it actually wants to send, or when it
should be sent, or who should send it. When it comes to the
First Amendment, the state-including its judges, juries, and
prosecutors-should stay out of the speech-scrutinizing busi187
ness altogether.
3. A Message-Based Approach Improperly Treats
Organizational Silence as Neutrality
Silence can speak. Depending on the circumstances, there
may be no better way to speak. If a schoolchild sits silently at a
desk while the class works through an algebra equation, that is
one thing. If the same child sits silently at a desk while the
class stands for the Pledge of Allegiance, that is quite another.
In the first instance, silence says nothing; in the second, silence
says it all.188 It communicates more powerfully than any combination of spoken words might ever manage.
Even if the dissent is correct that the BSA is determinedly
silent about homosexuality, 189 that silence should not be under186. Justice Stevens himself has recognized the importance of this difference in the area of race. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267,
315 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("It is one thing for a white child to be
taught by a white teacher that color, like beauty, is only 'skin deep'; it is far
more convincing to experience that truth [through the presence of racial diversity among teachers] on a day-to-day basis during the entire, ongoing learning
process.").
187. Cf Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 450 (1969) (stating that courts should not scrutinize "the interpretation of particular church doctrines [or] the importance of
those doctrines to the religion").
188. See West Virginia v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) (holding that
requiring a student member of Jehovah's Witnesses to recite the Pledge of Allegiance is unconstitutional).
189. "In short, Boy Scouts of America is simply silent on homosexuality."
Dale, 120 S.Ct. at 2470 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Even if this claim is an exaggeration, at the very least it is true the BSA does not want scoutmasters
teaching the boys anything directly about sexuality. The topic is to be avoided,
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stood as neutrality. At least since the Stonewall riot in New
York City in 1969, the event that is widely understood to have
launched the modern gay-rights movement, gay advocates have
insisted that silence on the subject of homosexuality come to an
end. 190 Gay advocates understand that silence signals tacit
disapproval of gay-rights claims, or at the very least embarrassment and shame about the subject. The "love that dare not
speak its name," as Oscar Wilde put it,19 1 has been above all a
love about which we dare not speak.
Here, as elsewhere, context matters. If homosexuality and
the demands for gay equality were not supremely contentious
issues in modern America, an insistence on silence about the
issue might mean little. The BSA would then be like the
schoolchild who remains silent during an algebra lesson. But
against the backdrop of loud, continuous, and insistent demands to discuss and take sides on gay-rights claims, a steadfast refusal to talk at all about the issue is hardly neutral. It is
itself a position, a "message." It is like the schoolchild who remains silent while students all around him recite the Pledge of
192
Allegiance.
Indeed, determined silence is not only nonneutral, it is
probably the most pervasive and potent obstacle to gay equality
in America today. Next to it, the hateful rhetoric of anti-gay
extremists is trivial. Refusing even to discuss the issue of the
morality of homosexuality is an effective way to insulate oneself and one's associates from having to think critically about it.
On the other hand, the "mere presence" of an openly gay person
will generate discussion and reflection on the topic. It is partly
to generate such critical self-examination that the citizenship
model of anti-discrimination law insists on reaching into heretofore private associations.

if possible, and boys are steered to other sources for counseling about it. Id.
190. "[W]e learned long ago ... that 'silence = death.' In politics, 'silence
zero progress.'" Michael Colby, Voting Booths, Yes. Closets, No. Silence,
Never., National Stonewall Democrats, at http'//stonewalldemocrats.orgpress/
press88.htm (Feb. 16, 2001).
191.

See Colin Spencer, HOMOSEXUALITY IN HISTORY 285 (1995) (quoting

Wilde's statement at his 1890s sodomy trial). Actually, Wilde was speaking
about affection between men and boys. But it has come to be understood as a
comment about homosexuality.
192. See Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642 (holding that a flag salute requirement
was unconstitutional as applied to schoolchildren members of Jehovah's Witnesses).
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And the desire to maintain silence-and therefore avoid
the consequences of critical self-examination-lies at the heart
of the BSA's exclusion of openly gay people. Deep anxiety
about the consequences of having to confront the issue is barely
concealed in the BSA's brief to the Court: 'What if, during a
discussion of sexual morality, Dale interjects his own opinion?
What if Dale brings his significant other to a Boy Scout banquet? What if Dale wears his Scouting uniform in a gay pride
parade?" 93 The answer is if any of these things happened, the
Boy Scouts would have to start talking about the issue. Excluding Dale, on the other hand, is a way to minimize the risk
that the subject will ever surface. Preserving traditional sexual
morality is the goal; silence is the method. We may not like the
goal or the method. But if the First Amendment secures some
space in which to develop one's own identity, 194 it surely guarantees enough to prevent the evolution of that identity in a direction the state demands.
4. A Message-Based Approach Disregards Practical
Organizational Needs
The freedom of expressive association protects more than
the group's desire to promulgate, or not to promulgate, a particular message. It also protects the group's ability to organize
and preserve itself in the face of a social backlash that would
arise from its compliance with a state's regulation. Thus, the
dissent is wrong to deny the BSA's associational "right to maintain an exclusionary membership policy simply out of fear of
what the public reaction would be if the group's membership
were opened up."195 That fear states a cognizable claim under
the First Amendment to resist compliance with state regulation
touching on organizational matters, including membership. It
is a right to preserve the association's very existence in a contentious social climate.
The freedom of association was not born in a claim about
the power of an organization to control its message. It was
born in a dispute about membership. In the late 1950s, the
pro-segregationist state of Alabama was harassing the NAACP
193. Brief for Petitioners at 38, Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446
(2000) (No. 99-699), available at 2000 WL 228616.
194. Cole & Eskridge, supra note 176, at 327 ("The First Amendment protects the individual's freedom to explore, develop, and expand upon her identity.").
195. Dale, 120 S.Ct. at 2471 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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under a state law requiring out-of-state corporations to register
to do business. 196 In court, the state moved for production of
the NAACP's bank statements, leases, deeds, and a membership list. 197 The NAACP resisted not on the grounds that it was
defending an "idea" about, for example, the sanctity of membership lists, but because protecting its membership list from
public disclosure was an important part of its ability to organize. The Court agreed:
The fact that Alabama... has taken no direct action.., to restrict
the right of petitioner's members to associate freely does not end inquiry into the effect of the production order. In the domain of these
indispensable liberties.., the decisions of this Court recognize that
abridgment of such rights, even though unintended, may inevitably
follow from varied forms of governmental action. 198

The Court paid close attention to the social climate in
which the NAACP operated. Preserving the privacy of the
membership list was, in the South at that time, a precondition
for the meaningful exercise of the right to associate. Disclosure
would expose members to various manifestations of public hostility, such as loss of jobs or even physical violence. Under such
circumstances, forcing the NAACP to comply with the state's
regulation would be "likely to affect adversely the ability of petitioner and its members to pursue their collective effort to foster beliefs which they admittedly have the right to advocate" by
"induc[ing] members to withdraw from the Association and dissuad[ing] others from joining it."199
The state responded that these harmful consequences
would flow "not from state action but from private community
pressures."200 The court quickly dismissed that argument.
"The crucial factor," held the Court, "is the interplay of governmental and private action, for it is only after the initial exertion of state power ...that private action takes hold."20 1 The
Court carefully noted that the NAACP would not be immune
from all state investigation and had not objected to divulging
the identity of its employees, as opposed to its rank-and-file
20 2
members.

196.

See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).

197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 453.
at 461 (citations omitted).
at 462-63.
at 463.
at 463-64.
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The NAACP and other groups successfully fought other
litigation against disclosure of membership lists 20 3 and other
sensitive internal information 2°4 under circumstances where
the group faced a loss of its own membership for complying
with the state's demands for information. This protection is
"all the more essential. .. , where the privacy is that of persons
20 5
espousing beliefs already unpopular with their neighbors.
Such cases are often thought to be about some organizational
right to maintain the privacy of sensitive information. They
are more properly understood, however, as having the instrumental purpose of exempting the association from compliance
in order to protect the ability of the group to organize effectively
and even to continue to exist.
Gay organizations have needed tight control over membership and other internal organizational matters as a practical
tool for organizing in a hostile social environment. 2 6 They
have keenly felt the need to keep and attract members by protecting them from public scorn. The coach of a team in a gay
softball league recently defended the league's rule limiting the
number of heterosexuals on a team: "If they open it up to
straights, a lot of people will quit," he explained. "One [heterosexual player] alone won't say [anything], but you get two together, and they're going to be making fun of, the [gay] kids,
07
mocking the kids."2
203. See Gibson v. Fla. Legislative Investigation Comm'n, 372 U.S. 539
(1963) (protecting the identity of members and contributors to NAACP); Louisiana v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293, 295-96 (1961) (noting that members feared
reprisals and hostilities after disclosure); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S.
516, 524 (1960) (stating that members feared harassment and threats of harm
after disclosure); Adolph Coors Co. v. Wallace, 570 F. Supp. 202, 207-08 (N.D.
Cal. 1983) (denying discovery of gay group's membership list in civil litigation
by Coors); see also Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1960) (protecting
teacher's associational right not to be forced to disclose his every associational
tie). Note that this principle of associational membership privacy does not exempt public corporations from divulging the identity of large shareholders.
Indeed, large shareholders in such corporations are required to make filings
with the Securities Exchange Commission.
204. Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm., 459 U.S. 87, 101
(1982) (holding that a political party was entitled to exemption from compelled
disclosure of campaign contributors and expenditures because of a "reasonable
probability of threats, harassment, or reprisals" against the group's members).
205. Gibson, 372 U.S. at 556-57.
206. Adolph Coors Co., 570 F. Supp. at 207-08.
207. Brittany Wallman, "Straight"PlayerLimit Divides Gay Softball, FORT
LAUDERDALE SUN-SENTINEL, Feb. 9, 2001, at Al, available at LEXIS, News

Library, News Group File.
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This practical need for exclusivity among gay organizations
has existed quite apart from any "message" the groups wanted
to send about exclusivity itself. The Society for Human Rights,
for example, excluded heterosexuals and bisexuals even though
there is no historical record of a "message" to which it might tie
that policy. Members of the Mattachine Society used pseudonyms to refer to one another, yet there is no indication mem20 8
bers organized for the purpose of shielding their identities.
These were just things the groups needed to do to survive.
On an appropriate and sufficient factual record, 20 9 an expressive association could make a claim similar to claims made
by the NAACP and other expressive associations that complying with a state's anti-discrimination law by admitting openly
gay scoutmasters would be "likely to affect adversely the ability
of [it] and its members to pursue their collective effort" by "induc[ing] members to withdraw from the Association and dis2 10
suad[ing] others from joining it."
In Dale, the BSA did not make an argument that excluding
openly gay scoutmasters was important to its continued functioning or its survival. Perhaps that is because the record on
this point had not been sufficiently developed. Or perhaps that
is because even making the argument would risk becoming a
self-fulfilling prophecy in the event of a court loss. At most, the
BSA cited a 1993 policy statement suggesting that gays do not
"provide a role model consistent with [Scouting families'] expectations."211 That may have been a significant understatement
of the problem the Scouts might face from rebellious families
and sponsors if forced to admit openly gay scoutmasters.
There was reason to believe the BSA would risk major defections in the event of an adverse decision. An amicus brief
filed on behalf of a powerful group of troop sponsors-including
the Catholic Church, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
208.

See supra Part I.B.

209. One might ask why the expressive association should need to make a
record of this danger at all. It should be enough, on this view, for the association to assert the existence of the danger. The response is that the organizational-necessity aspect of associational freedom discussed here is not directly
tied to the First Amendment interest in protecting speech; it is purely instrumental. It is appropriate, on the other hand, to defer to the association's assertions in the message and impairment analysis discussed above because
those assertions are directly related to the content of the group's message and
thus to the protection of speech itself.
210.

NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 462-63 (1958).

211.

Boy Scouts ofAm. v. Dale, 120 S.Ct. 2446, 2453 (2000).
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Saints, and a scouting organization within the United Methodist Church-warned,
If the appointment of scout leaders cannot be limited to those who live
and affirm the sexual standards of [the] BSA and its religious sponsors, the Scouting Movement as now constituted will cease to exist.
Amicus the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints-the largest
single sponsor of Scouting units in the United States-would withif it were compelled to accept openly homosexual
draw from Scouting
12
scoutleaders.

This was a dagger held at the organizational heart of the
BSA. 213 The social climate in which the BSA operates-like the
social climate in which the NAACP or the Socialist Workers
Party operated-includes opinions and attitudes over which the
group has no control. The parents of many Boy Scouts or potential Boy Scouts believe that an openly gay scoutmaster will
be a poor role model for their sexual values. 2 14 Presumably,
they also fear that an openly gay scoutmaster may "recruit"
their children into homosexuality2 15 or may even molest their
children. 2 16 Such parents may withdraw their children or refuse to enlist them if the BSA is forced to admit openly gay
scoutmasters.
Although fears among parents about recruitment and molestation are unfounded or at least exaggerated, they are nonetheless real and quite common. The BSA might argue that it
must take account of these attitudes about homosexuality if it
is to remain intact. Otherwise, large sponsors and numerous
families may withdraw or refuse to join. In this sense, excluding gay scoutmasters would not be an end but a means. But it
exercise of the group's freeis no less important to the effective
217
dom of expressive association.
212. Brief of Amicus Curiae National Catholic Committee on Scouting et
al., In Support of Petitioners at 25, Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446
(2000) (No. 99-699), availableat 2000 WL 235234.
213. Counsel for Dale came close to acknowledging this point after the decision: "I think the organization has in essence been hijacked by one faction of
its members." Why the Boy Scouts Case Went Down: An Interview with the
Lawyer Who Argued the Supreme Court Case, THE GAY AND LESBIAN REV.,
Jan.-Feb. 2001, at 15-16, available at http'J/www.glereview.com.
214. See Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2453. This is the only parent-related point the
BSA explicitly cited as a reason for its exclusion of openly gay scoutmasters.
215. There is no evidence that children are recruited into homosexuality.
See RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 296-99, 403 (1992).
216. Homosexuals are no more likely to molest children than heterosexuals. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 42, at 214.
217. On the other hand, it may not be true that admitting openly gay
scoutmasters would cost the BSA more members than excluding them has. In
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There is a difference, of course, between the organizational
needs of the NAACP in the 1950s and 1960s and those of the
BSA today. By refusing to disclose the names of its members,
the NAACP was protecting those members from the prejudice
of people outside the organization (white racists). By refusing
to admit openly gay scoutmasters, the BSA is protecting itself
against its members' (or potential members') own prejudices.
That difference makes the BSA a less sympathetic claimant
than the NAACP, to be sure. But it does not diminish the
group's need to frame its membership policies in ways that will
allow it to achieve its larger aims.
Organizational needs are particularly acute in the area of
membership. "There can be no clearer example of an intrusion
into the internal structure or affairs of an association than a
regulation that forces the group to accept members it does not
desire."2 18 Organizational requirements in this area are best
known to the organization itself. The risk is great that outside
observers-like courts and juries-necessarily less familiar
with the circumstances, will err in determining which membership policies fit the organization's needs. Moreover, the interests of such decisionmakers in preserving anti-discrimination
law do not align perfectly with the organization's. Where error
is made, these decisionmakers will make it in favor of the law
and against the organization. This counsels deference, above
all, to an expressive association's judgments about whom to
admit.
Thus, even if the BSA could not point to a coherent message about homosexuality, or to a relationship between its message and its exclusionary policy, it might plausibly claim that
admitting openly gay scoutmasters would be "likely to affect
adversely" its ability to pursue its other ends by "induc[ing]
the wake of Dale, the BSA has endured a ferocious backlash from fimding
sources, including other private organizations and local governments, and
from parents who do not want their children associated with an organization
that discriminates against gays. "Unfortunately, we're in a period where
Scout numbers are suffering across the country from the national publicity [after Dale]," said the president of the large Dallas BSA council. Todd Bensman,
Boy Scouts' Rolls Decline By 25%, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 25, 2001, at
29A, available at http//www.dallasnews.com/metro/296568_boyscouts_
25me.html. National BSA officials deny a drop in membership. See id.Even
if Scouting rolls have dropped in the wake of Dale, however, it is conceivable
they would have dropped even more if the BSA had lost in Dale. This no-win
predicament may be just the problem the BSA hoped to avoid by not publicly
highlighting its gay exclusion in the first place.
218. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984).

2001]

AFTER DALE: A TRIPARTITE APPROACH

1563

members to withdraw" and "dissuad[ing] others from joining."2 19 The dissent's quick rejection of this instrumental aspect of associational freedom simply ignores history.
III. FREEDOM OF EXPRESSIVE ASSOCIATION AND
ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAW: A TRIPARTITE APPROACH
We need a strategy for dealing with the conflict between
associational freedom and anti-discrimination law that avoids
the intensely message-based, and therefore perilous, focus of
the Dale dissent. The approach also needs to be more completely theorized than the majority's deferential, sketchy, and
somewhat disingenuous version of a compelling-interests
analysis. It needs to harmonize existing law in this areaexplaining how the Court could uphold the associational freedom claim in Dale while denying it in cases like Rotary International and Roberts-while simultaneously providing a relatively clear road map for the future.
Such an approach, as a first cut, should distinguish between primarily commercial associationsand primarily expressive associations. This distinction will suffice for most occasions. However, to handle the truly hard case of an association
that mixes significant and socially-important expressive activity that is also substantially commercial, we will need a third
category of quasi-expressive associations. The analysis for this
third group should focus on the nature of the specific activity or
aspect of the organization sought to be regulated, generally
protecting the group where it is expressive and generally enforcing anti-discrimination law where it is not. The court must
determine which of these three types of associations is presented in a given case.
Note that the suggested approach will often require a detailed case-by-case examination of the nature of the association
(whether commercial or expressive) or the nature of the relevant activity (whether commercial or expressive, in the case of
quasi-expressive associations). Outcomes will depend on the
facts at hand, reviewed under general principles. Hard calls
are unavoidable, however, in this area if we are to avoid the extremes of absolute associational freedom, on the one hand, or
ubiquitous anti-discrimination law, on the other.

219.

NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449,462-63 (1958).
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A. EXPRESSIVE, COMMERCIAL, AND QUASI-EXPRESSiVE
ASSOCIATIONS

Although the Court has not explicitly adopted it, the distinction between expressive associations (generally protected
from the application of anti-discrimination law) and primarily
commercial associations (not strongly protected) appears to
drive the results in this area. This Part distills how the distinction works and how it might apply to future cases. It also
suggests an approach to quasi-expressive associations.
Under the tripartite approach, the BSA might be considered either expressive or quasi-expressive (but not commercial).
Either way, the outcome in Dale would be the same: the BSA
would be protected from anti-discrimination law in the selection of its scoutmasters. If the BSA is expressive, it should also
be protected in its selection of Scouts and employees. If it is
quasi-expressive,
however,
the
application
of antidiscrimination law to Scouts and even employees would present
a different and more difficult case requiring a more contextualized analysis.
1. The O'Connor Concurrence in Roberts
In Roberts v. United States Jaycees, the Court rejected an
all-male organization's claim that a state anti-discrimination
law infringed its freedom of association by requiring it to admit
women. 220 The Court held that the freedom of association must
yield to "regulations adopted to serve compelling state interests, unrelated to the suppression of ideas, that cannot be
achieved through means significantly less restrictive of associational freedoms." 22 1 The Court held that admitting women as
full voting members to the Jaycees would not impose "any serious burden on the male members' freedom of expressive asso222
ciation."
Justice O'Connor concurred in the result but offered a different rationale. 223 She distinguished between commercial as220. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 628-29.
221. Id. at 623. The Court continued to follow, at least formally, this compelling-interests test in Dale. However, it deferred on the existence and meaning of the BSA's message, deferred on the impact of the regulation on that
message, and devoted only one sentence to dismissing New Jersey's interest in
the regulation. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 120 S.Ct. 2446, 2457 (2000).
222. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 626.
223. Id. at 632 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Note that Justice Kennedy
joined a similar concurrence by Justice O'Connor in New York State Club Ass'n
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sociations and expressive associations, finding the majority's
stated test both overprotective and underprotective of associational freedom. It was overprotective, in her view, of primarily
commercial associations because it "cast[] doubt on the power of
States to pursue the profoundly important goal of ensuring
nondiscriminatory access to commercial opportunities in our
society."224 At the same time, the test offered "insufficient proburtection to expressive associations and places inappropriate
225
dens" on them in claiming First Amendment protection.
Justice O'Connor objected to the Court's insistence that the
group must show a connection between its message and its
membership policy. '"Whether an association is or is not constitutionally protected in the selection of its membership should
the association says or why its members
not depend on what
226
say it," she wrote.
The threshold inquiry, for Justice O'Connor, is whether the
association is expressive or commercial. If the association is
expressive, it is entitled to full First Amendment protection of
both the content of its message and the choice of its members.
There need be no connection between the group's message and
its membership policy. "[T]he formation of an expressive association is the creation of a voice," she wrote, "and the selection
of members is the definition of that voice."227
If the association is commercial, on the other hand, it "enjoys only minimal constitutional protection of its recruitment,
training, and solicitation activities."228 The regulation need be

v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 20 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Predominately commercial organizations are not entitled to claim a First
Amendment associational or expressive right to be free from the antidiscrimination provisions triggered by the law."). Therefore, two of the five
members of the Dale majority have explicitly adopted the commercialexpressive association distinction.
224. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 632 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
225. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
226. Id. at 633 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
227. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring). The selection of members is inherently
tied to the promulgation of an expressive association's message. The state will
almost never have an interest sufficiently compelling to overcome the association's interest in defining that message. Other activities of an expressive association, however, may be subject to a different calculus where the state's interest in the regulation is much greater. A street gang (even if such a group
could properly be characterized as expressive) that wanted to express its dislike for blacks by physically attacking them could not claim an exemption from
laws prohibiting assault.
228. Id. at 635 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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only rationally related to the government's ends. "The Constitution does not guarantee a right to choose employees, customers, suppliers, or those with whom one engages in simple com229
mercial transactions, without restraint from the State."
How are we to decide when an association is commercial
and thus unprotected from anti-discrimination law in its choice
of members? It is commercial "when, and only when, the association's activities are not predominantly of the type protected
by the First Amendment,"2 30 that is, it is not "predominantly
engaged in protected expression." 3 When the association "enters the marketplace of commerce in any substantial degree it
loses the complete control over its membership that it would
otherwise enjoy if it confined its affairs to the marketplace of
232
ideas."
Because this formulation is fairly abstract, and can sound
question-begging, it is useful to consider a few cases in which
the Court has appeared to give greater associational protection
to expressive groups and less associational protection to commercial groups.
2. The Commercial-Expressive Distinction in Other First
Amendment Cases
Greater solicitude for expressive association and expressive
purposes than for commercial association and commercial purposes, along the lines Justice O'Connor suggested in her Roberts concurrence, is evident in the Court's associational and
other First Amendment jurisprudence. Speech with a strong
commercial dimension or purpose receives less protection than
core speech in a variety of contexts, including boycotts, lawyer
solicitation, commercial speech, and campaign finance. Something like this same relaxed protection for commercial activity
is also a familiar feature of our constitutional landscape outside
233
the First Amendment.
229. Id. at 634-35 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
230. Id. at 635 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
231. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
232. Id. at 636 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
233. Here are three examples of what I mean. First, as a general matter,
since the demise of Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), the Court has reviewed economic regulation very deferentially, asking only whether the restriction is rational. State regulation of non-economic personal liberties, like
using contraceptives, gets a much more hostile judicial reception. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 493 (1965). Second, the Fourth Amendment's search-and-seizure provision generally requires less justification for
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The purpose of the association or speech matters for First
Amendment analysis. Boycotts organized for political purposes
are a protected form of association, 234 while those for economic
purposes are not.2 35 While businesses cannot associate to suppress competition, and "[w]hile States have broad power to
regulate economic activity, [there2 is
no] comparable right to
36
prohibit peaceful political activity.
The Court has drawn a similar commercial-expressive line
in the area of lawyer solicitation. In In re Primus, a lawyer had
written a letter to woman who had allegedly been required to
be sterilized in order to receive Medicaid benefits. 237 The
ACLU attorney suggested in the solicitation letter that she
challenge the constitutionality of the sterilization requirement.
The Court struck down an anti-solicitation disciplinary rule as
applied to the lawyer, reasoning that the litigation was "not a
technique of resolving private differences'; it is 'a form of political expression' and 'political association,"238 which are "core
39
First Amendment rights."2
In Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, by contrast, the Court
upheld an anti-solicitation disciplinary rule as applied to a tort
lawyer who contacted a woman that had been in an accident. 240
The Court distinguished In re Primus because the lawyer's solicitation did not involve "political expression or an exercise of
associational freedom... to secure constitutionally guaranteed
... rights."241 The lawyer was merely "procur[ing] remunerative employment."242 As such, his conduct was analogous to

searching a business than for searching a private home. See generally WAYNE
R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT §
10.2 (3d ed. 1996). Third, the Fifth Amendment's guarantee against selfincrimination applies to individuals in their personal capacity but not to corporations or to corporate officers. I want to thank Don Dripps for pointing out
these examples.
234. NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 907 (1982).
235. Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S. 492, 50407 (1988).

236.

Claiborne,458 U.S. at 913 (emphasis added).

237.

In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412,415-17 (1978).

238. Id. at 428 (emphasis added) (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,
429, 431 (1963)).
239. Id. at 432 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 45 (1976)).
240. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447,467 (1978).
241. Id. at 458 (citing Button, 371 U.S. at 442).
242. Id. at 459.
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commercial speech, which occupies only a "subordinate position
2 43
in the scale of First Amendment values.
Consider some of the differences between the Court's
244
treatment of core political speech and commercial speech.
Content-based restrictions on core speech are subjected to strict
scrutiny,2 4 5 while such restrictions on commercial speech must
withstand only intermediate scrutiny. 246 Under the commercial
speech doctrine, solicitation by businesses is fully regulable,
while charitable solicitation for political advocacy purposes is
protected because it "does more than inform private economic
decisions and is not primarily concerned with providing information about the characteristics and costs of goods and services."247 Prior restraint on core speech faces a heavy presumption of unconstitutionality, 248 while prior restraint on
commercial speech does not.2 49 Core speech advocating illegal
conduct is protected unless it is imminently likely to produce
lawless action, 250 while commercial speech proposing illegal
conduct is unprotected. 25' The overbreadth of a restriction on
core speech enables a challenger to attack the facial validity of
the restriction, 252 while the overbreadth of a commercial speech
restriction does not. 253 The availability of a less restrictive alternative is usually fatal to regulations on core speech, 254 but
not to regulations of commercial speech. 255 And state regulations compelling core speech are strictly scrutinized, 256 while
those related to commercial speech generally are not.2 57
243. Id. at 456.
244. I want to thank Jim Chen for highlighting some of these differences.
245. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395 (1992).
246. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S.
557, 564 (1980).
247. Schaumberg v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 444 U.S. 620, 632 (1980).
248. N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1973) (per curiam).
249. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 772 n.24 (1976).
250.

See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447-48 (1969).

251. See Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489,
496 (1982) (holding that the "government may regulate or ban entirely" commercial speech "proposing an illegal transaction").
252. See Goodingv. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 521 (1972).
253. See Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 381 (1977).
254. See Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975).

255. See Bd. of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 477-78 (1989).
256. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943).
257.

See Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 470-71
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In the area of campaign finance regulation, the Court also
distinguishes speech by individuals and expressive associations, on the one hand, and speech by commercial entities, on
the other. The former group has a right to spend on campaigns
and referenda 8s By contrast, corporations must submit to restrictions on their campaign spending, on the theory that corporate wealth distorts political debate and that the state's
greater power to charter corporations includes the lesser power
to restrict campaign expenditures. 259 It is acceptable to require
that independent campaign expenditures by profit-making
businesses be made out of segregated funds, while such a restriction is unacceptable as applied to groups that are "more
260
akin to voluntary political associations than business firms."
Even a non-profit corporation (like the Michigan Chamber of
Commerce) that is involved in a wide range of activities other
than political activity can be regulated by an expenditure-limits
law, while one that is "formed for the express purpose of promoting political ideas, [and does not] engage in business activi26 1
ties" could not be.
In the area of compelled payment of union dues, the Court
has drawn a similar line between requiring employees to subsidize employment-related union activities and requiring payment for the union's ideological or political causes. In Abood v.
Detroit Board of Education, for example, the Court held that
individual employees could be made to pay compulsory fees for
the union's collective bargaining expenses, which contribute to
the economic well-being of all employees. 262 The First Amendment, however, prohibits requiring an individual in a union
shop "to contribute to the support of an ideological cause he
may oppose."2 63 Thus, Justice O'Connor's distinction between
the protection accorded business-related speech and the protec-

(1997).
258. See FEC v. Nat'l Conservative PAC, 470 U.S. 480 (1985) (holding unconstitutional limits on political action committee spending); Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1 (1976) (holding unconstitutional limits on campaign expenditures,
independent expenditures, and individual candidates' expenditures).
259. See Austin v. Mich. State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 658
(1990) (upholding state restriction on corporate independent campaign expenditures, emphasizing the "unique legal and economic characteristics of corporations").
260. FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 263 (1986).'
261. Austin, 494 U.S. at 662.
262. 431 U.S. 209, 222-23 (1977).
263. Id. at 235 (emphasis added).
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tion accorded core speech is a common one in First Amendment
jurisprudence.
In Dale itself, the Court implicitly followed the analysis of
Justice O'Connor in Roberts. It noted in the second sentence of
the opinion that the BSA "is a private, not-for-profit organization engaged in instilling its system of values in young people.

2 64

The Court openly worried that the expansion of anti-

discrimination law beyond "clearly commercial entities, such as
restaurants, bars, and hotels" would trample First Amendment
265
liberties.
By focusing its attention on the activities of the BSA ("instilling its system of values in young people"), 266 the majority in
Dale tacitly accepted Justice O'Connor's concern in Roberts
about scrutiny of a group's message. By deferring to the BSA
on the connection between its message and its membership policy,267 the majority in Dale tacitly accepted Justice O'Connor's

criticism of the majority opinion in Roberts that such an inquiry
into the message-membership connection was offensive to the
values of the First Amendment. 268 By dismissing New Jersey's
interest in promoting equality with a single sentence, 269 the
majority in Dale tacitly accepted O'Connor's worry in Roberts
that compelling-interests analysis might be underprotective of
associational rights. There is little doubt that a majority of the
Court is now following Justice O'Connor's approach in delineating associational freedom. I only urge that the Court do so explicitly, with a slight adjustment discussed in Part III.A.4 below for quasi-expressive associations.

264. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446, 2449 (2000).
265.

Id. at 2456 (emphasis added).

266. Id. at 2449.
267. See id. at 2453.
268.

Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 633-34 (1989) (O'Connor, J.,

concurring).
269. Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2457 ("The state interests embodied in New Jersey's public accommodations law do not justify such a severe intrusion on the
Boy Scouts' rights to freedom of expressive association."). The Court did not
hold that protecting gays from discrimination is not a compelling state interest. It may very well be a compelling state interest, but it is not strong enough
to overcome the BSA's interest in maintaining its membership policy. Also, it
is unlikely that Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, who joined the majority in
Dale, would agree that eradicating anti-gay discrimination is not a compelling
state interest. After all, Justice Kennedy wrote (and Justice O'Connor joined)
the majority opinion in Romer v. Evans that declared gays needed the protection of anti-discrimination laws in order to participate in ordinary civic life.
517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996).
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3. Characteristics of Commercial Associations
For purposes of the tripartite approach, the threshold determination of whether the group is commercial, expressive, or
quasi-expressive is critical. If the association can be categorized as either commercial or expressive, the analysis is relatively straightforward. Expressive associations will usually
prevail against an anti-discrimination law, especially in sensitive organizational matters like the composition of a group's
membership. 270 Commercial associations will usually lose
against an anti-discrimination law, since the law need only be
rational.2 7 ' The Court's case law helps demarcate the line between protected expressive associations and largely unprotected commercial associations.
The most obvious example of a predominantly commercial
association is a for-profit business, such as a car manufacturer
or large commercial law firm. Another obvious example is a
traditional public accommodation, such as a theater, restaurant, or hotel. 272 Such a business or accommodation has "enter[ed] the marketplace of commerce [to a] substantial degree."273 A for-profit business or public accommodation has no
right to control, free of state restraint, the employees, customers, and suppliers with whom it does business. Thus, the provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that prohibit discrimination in public accommodations (Title II) and in private
employment (Title VII) survive the tripartite approach suggested here.
More difficult cases of classification arise where, as often
happens, the association mixes some degree of commercial and
expressive activity. Businesses, for example, often lobby for tax
and other laws from which they will benefit. They may also
advance ideas through advertising and other methods, as when
270. See Dale, 120 S. Ct. at 2457; Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557, 572-73 (1995).

271. N.Y. State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 11-13 (1988);
Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537 (1987); Roberts, 468
U.S. at 634 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
272. See Hishon v. King & Spaulding, 467 U.S. 69, 78 (1984) (rejecting the
associational freedom claim of law firm); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241, 249-50 (1964) (rejecting the associational freedom claim
of hotel). The provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, including Title II
(prohibiting discrimination in "public accommodations") and Title VII (prohibiting discrimination in private employment), including the voluminous case
law interpreting them, will be a useful guide in this area.
273. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 636 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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the tobacco industry publicly opposes the regulation of nicotine.
These are expressive activities that help advance the association's commercial interests. At the same time, expressive associations, like political parties, may rent expensive convention
halls for meetings, collect and distribute large amounts of
money for expenses, and even employ people for some tasks.
These are commercial activities that help advance the association's expressive interests.
In such cases, "[t]he purposes of an association, and the
purposes of its members in adhering to it, are doubtless relevant in determining whether the association is primarily engaged in protected expression."274 If the members of the association have come together primarily to make money either
through commercial transactions or through business networking, the association is commercial. This is true even if the as2 75
sociation itself is non-profit.
Even non-profit associations may be commercial if they
employ a vast array of persons, manage an extensive physical
plant, and charge substantial fees to those who use the facilities. Under a similar definition, the California Supreme Court
has found that the Boys Club 276 and a private nonprofit country
club 277 are "business establishments" for purposes of their
membership decisions within the meaning of a state antidiscrimination law. Membership in such clubs or access to its
facilities is tantamount to admission to a place of public
amusement or restaurant. A membership fee under those circumstances is "simply a ticket of admission to a recreational facility that [was] open to a large segment of the public."2 78
Note that the primary-purpose inquiry does not ask
whether the members have come together to promote the specific message the association claims will be impaired by compliance with the anti-discrimination law. The primary-purpose
inquiry applies to the categorization of the group as "commercial" or "expressive," not to the content of the group's message.

274.

Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring); see also cases cited supra notes 271-73.

275. N.Y. State Club Ass'n, 487 U.S. at 8, 13-14; Rotary Int'l, 481 U.S. at
539, 549.
276. Isbister v. Boys Club, 707 P.2d 212, 217 (Cal. 1985).
277. Warfield v. Peninsula Golf & Country Club, 896 P.2d 776, 778 (Cal.
1995).
278. Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts, 952 P.2d 218, 236
(1998) (referring to the Boys' Club of Santa Cruz, Inc. in Isbister, 707 P.2d 212
(Cal. 1985)).
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An expressive association, under this approach, enjoys a general exemption from anti-discrimination law regardless of
whether the particularapplicationof the law trenches on a certain message. A commercial association enjoys no such exemption, even if application of the anti-discrimination law will
279
trench on a certain message.
Ordinarily, the primary purpose of the members in coming
together as an association can be determined by examining
what they actually do when they associate. In Roberts, for example, the Jaycees (or Junior Chamber of Commerce) primarily
trained members in "the art of solicitation and management. '2 80
This training was meant to give members "an advantage in
business."2 8 ' Recognizing the value of this training, "business
firms... sometimes pay the dues of individual member[s]." 282
The primary activity of the group was the sale of memberships
in the group itself, an activity by which Jaycees "hone their solicitation and management skills. ' 28 3 The Jaycees even referred to members as "customers" and memberships as a
2 84
"product.
In New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, the
Court also emphasized the commercial nature of the association's purpose by reference to its activities. 2 85 The association
at issue was a nonprofit corporation that served as a consortium of 125 other large private clubs and associations. 286 The
clubs were subject to the anti-discrimination provisions of a
New York City ordinance that covered organizations with more
than 400 members that provide regular meal service to members and receive payment from or on behalf of nonmembers "for

279. This does not mean, of course, that a state could directly regulate the
content of a commercial association's message. See infra Part HIIA.4. The
only point here is that the First Amendment permits an anti-discrimination
law to force the business, for example, not to discriminate against a protected
class even for a job with expressive functions. General Motors, as a commercial association, could be required consistent with the Constitution not to discriminate on the basis of race in the selection of its paid corporate spokesperson.

280. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 639 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
281. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
282. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
283. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
284. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring).
285. 487 U.S. 1, 12 (1988).
286. See id. at 8.
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the furtherance of trade or business. 2 87 The city concluded the
members of the consortium were "commercial" because they
were places "'where business deals are.., made and personal
contacts valuable for business purposes, employment and professional advancement are formed.' 28 8 In upholding the facial
constitutionality of the city ordinance as applied against the
clubs, the Court considered it "crucial" to evaluate whether
"business activity is prevalent among them."289 The Court was
unable to judge whether the city ordinance might be unconstitutional as applied against a particular club within the consorcharactertium because there was "no specific evidence on29the
0
Court.
the
before
record
the
in
club"
any
of
istics
The fact that a primarily commercial association may involve elements of arguably expressive socializing also does not
make it expressive. Again, the issue is resolved by reference to
the underlying commercial activity of the group, not by reference to any message expressed. In City of Dallas v. Stanglin,
the Court upheld the constitutionality of a city ordinance restricting admission to certain dance halls to people between the
ages of fourteen and eighteen. 291 The Court noted that the
the
dance hall in question charged admission to members of
292 It
public and served as many as 1,000 customers per night.
noted that the teenagers who come to dance "are not members
of any organized association; they are patrons of the same business establishment."293 The patrons were strangers to each
other and do not "'take positions on public questions' or perform
any of the other similar activities" protected by the First
Amendment. 294 "We think the activity of these dance-hall padancing-is
trons-coming together to engage in recreational
295
not protected by the First Amendment."
The fact that a primarily commercial association also engages in some expressive activity does not make it an expressive association. Thus, the Jaycees were a commercial associa-

287. Id. at 6 (citing N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-102(9) (1986)).
288. Id. at 5-6 (quoting Local Law No. 63 of 1984, § 1).
289. Id. at 18 (emphasis added).
290.

Id. at 14 (emphasis omitted).

291. 490 U.S. 19, 28 (1989).
292. Id. at 24-25.
293. Id. at 24 (emphasis added).
294. Id. at 25 (quoting in part Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club,
481 U.S. 537, 548 (1987)).
295. Id.
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tion even though they engaged in "a not insubstantial" amount
of "advocacy of political and public causes."2 96 The Roberts rationale would seem to apply to most trade associations, as well
as business-networking associations, whose principal activity is
advancing the commercial interests of their constituent members. 297 A commercial association cannot gain First Amendment protection by occasionally (or incidentally) engaging in
such expressive activity.
Similarly, an expressive association is not commercial just
because it engages in some commercial activity, or even just because it makes a profit. 298 For example, an expressive association may collect dues from members, purchase printing materials, rent lecture halls, and serve refreshments at its
meetings. 299 These activities do not transform its primary
character from expressive to commercial. The BSA is arguably
expressive even though it engages in significant commercial activity.300
A group's characterization of itself as expressive is not dispositive. In Board of Directors of Rotary International v. Rotary Club, the Court upheld the application of a state antidiscrimination law against a group that claimed an associational right to exclude women.30 1 Rotary International, a nonprofit club, billed itself as "an organization of business and professional men united worldwide who provide humanitarian
service, encourage high ethical standards in all vocations, and
help build goodwill and peace in the world."30 2 Although this
sounds fairly expressive, the Court noted the conclusions of the
state court about the group: "Each active [Rotary] member
must work in a leadership capacity in his business or profession";30 3 each member may propose. an additional member "in

296. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. '609, 639 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting U.S. Jaycees v. McClure, 709 F.2d 1560, 1570 (8th Cir.
1983)).
297. N.Y. State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 12 (1988) (noting that clubs may involve "a considerable amount of private or intimate association").
298. N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1963).
299. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 635 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
300. On the other hand, the BSA might also be considered quasi-expressive
under the tripartite approach. See infra Part III.A.4.
301. 481 U.S. 537, 549 (1987).
302.

ROTARY MANUAL OF PROCEDURE 7 (1981), quoted in Rotary Int'l, 481

U.S. at 539.
303. Rotary Int'l, 481 U.S. at 540.
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the same business or professional classification"; 3°4 Rotary International had "'businesslike attributes,"' including a "complex
structure, large staff and budget, and extensive publishing activities"; business advantages of membership were not incidental; and "'business concerns are a motivating factor in joining
local clubs.' 30 5 These factors were enough to bring Rotary International within the anti-discrimination law's definition of
"business establishment" and informed the Court's judgment in
denying its associational claim.
4. Hard Cases: Quasi-Expressive Associations
Some associations simply defy categorization as either
commercial or expressive because they mix significant aspects
of both. Certain associations are both expressive in very important respects and "enter[] the marketplace of commerce [to a]
substantial degree."30 6 Notable among these are many private
schools, which are often important centers for moral instruction
yet also have substantial physical plants, big budgets, large
numbers of employees, and are broadly open to all who can afford to pay. Other examples of this genre are media outlets, including newspapers, which are obviously critical to the functioning of democratic self-government yet are commercial in
many of the same ways as private schools. A third example
may be certain large private clubs, such as the BSA itself. For
such groups, the distinction between commercial and expressive associations is too rough. We need a third category, quasiexpressive associations, and a more contextualized focus for
such groups.
Here is how the approach would work. First, a determination must be made as to whether the association at issue is expressive, commercial, or quasi-expressive. If it is expressive or
commercial, application of th anti-discrimination law should
be decided as discussed above. If the association is quasiexpressive, the inquiry should focus on the nature of the activity or internal operation sought to be brought into compliance
with anti-discrimination law. If the activity or internal operation at issue is primarily expressive, the activity or internal op-

304. Id. (quoting 2 ROTARY BASIc LIBRARY, CLUB SERVICE 67-69 (1981)).

305. Id. at 542-43 (quoting in part Rotary Club v. Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary
Int'l, 224 Cal. Rptr. 213, 226 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986)).
306.

Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 636 (1984) (O'Connor, J., con-

curring).
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eration should generally be exempt from compliance. If it is
primarily commercial, it should not enjoy such an exemption.
For example, suppose a private school qualified as quasiexpressive under the above definition. Under the suggested
approach, the freedom of expressive association ought to protect the school in its choice of instructors for the students, since
teachers are intrinsic to the expressive activity of the school.
They not only serve as role models for students but also directly
transmit the schools' values through instruction. It is hard to
imagine a more quintessentially expressive function than
teaching. On the other hand, it would be difficult to see how a
private school's employment decisions about maintenance or
secretarial personnel are expressive. Employment decisions in
these non-expressive areas should generally not be exempt
from the requirements of an applicable anti-discrimination law.
This is so because application of the law in these circumstances
is unlikely to inhibit the advocacy of the association's ideas.
In fact, in the Court's jurisprudence, commerciallyoperated, non-sectarian private schools appear to be an example of quasi-expressive associations. In Runyon v. McCrary, for
example, the Court denied the associational freedom claim of
private schools that wanted to exclude black children. 30 7 The
plaintiffs in Runyon brought suit under Section 1981 of the
1866 Civil Rights Act.308 The Court interpreted this federal
statute to "prohibit[] private, commercially operated, nonsectarian schools from denying admission to prospective students because they are Negroes."309 The schools at issue charged tuition to the parents, advertised widely, and made themselves
open to the general public. The Court noted that parents and
children had an associational right to attend a school advocating racial segregation. 3 10 Yet neither the schools' undeniable
role in instructing children nor their desire to promote a message of racism exempted them from compliance with §1981. Although the school and parents had a right to teach racist doctrine, the Court held they had no associational right to exclude
black children.3 11
The reason for this result is instructive: the schools had not
shown "that discontinuance of discriminatory admission prac307. 427 U.S. 160, 176 (1976).

308. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994) (codifying § I of the Civil Rights Act of 1886).
309. Runyon, 427 U.S. at 168 (emphasis added).
310. See id. at 176.
311. See id.
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tices would inhibit in any way the teaching in these schools of
any ideas or dogma.' 3 12 That is, to prevail against the antidiscrimination law, the associational right had to be linked to
some expressive function. The private schools at issue in
Runyon had not shown how admitting black students would
But. complying with the antiimpair their message.
discrimination law in the employment of instructors might prethe tripartite apsent a different case. Thus, Runyon survives
313
proach and is still good law after Dale.
A similar analysis could be applied to many media organizations. For example, a large, general circulation newspaper is
likely a quasi-expressive association, mixing significant elements of expression and commerce. Under the suggested approach, its decisions about whom to hire to deliver newspapers
should be subject to anti-discrimination law. Such decisions
have little bearing on the newspaper's expressive functions. On
the other hand, its decisions about whom to admit to its editorial board are a different matter, bearing directly on the newspaper's expressive activity.3 14 Those decisions might very well
warrant First Amendment immunity from anti-discrimination
law.
The BSA itself may be an example of a third category of
quasi-expressive associations: large private clubs that are
broadly open to the public and engage in substantial commercial activity yet are not significant places of business networking or commercial deal-making (which would make them commercial associations 3 15 ). Although the Court did not discuss the
commercial aspects of the BSA in its opinion, there is some evidence the group engages in significant business activity.
There can be little question the BSA manages a substantial physical plant nationwide, has a large budget, sells registered products to the public, and employs numerous people. In
1997, the national BSA earned 20% of its operating revenue
from its retail operations. 3 16 Since 1992, the BSA has devel-

312. Id. (quoting McCrary v. Runyon, 515 F.2d 1082, 1087 (4th Cir. 1975)).
313. ContraHunter, supra note 4, at 1603 (questioning whether Runyon is
still good law after Dale).
314. Daniel A. Farber, Speaking in the FirstPerson Plural:Expressive Associationsand the FirstAmendment, 85 MINN. L. REV. 1483, 1500 (2001).
315. See supra Part III.A.3.

316. Greg Coolidge, Note, Worshipping a Sacred Cow: Curran v. Mount
Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts of America, 29 Sw. U. L. REV. 401, 424
(2000).
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oped a retail chain that sells a wide range of clothing and
equipment. There are now twenty-one such stores around the
country,
which do 80% of their business with the general public. 3 17
In one Boy Scout council in California alone, the group
owns an administrative building and four camps, has a paid
staff of twenty-two full-time employees, and has an annual
budget exceeding $1.7 million.3 18 The same council owns and
operates a retail shop open to the public, where it sells clothing
319
bearing its name.
On the other hand, nonmembers cannot purchase admission to pack meetings, overnight hikes, recreational facilities,
or educational activities. The BSA does not sell the primary incidents of membership. The BSA's business activities with the
public are therefore arguably distinct from its core membership
320
functions.
Evaluating these facts, the California Supreme Court held
in Curranv. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts of America, that the Boy Scouts is a "business establishment" in its
business activities with the public involving retail stores and
licensing activities. 321 Thus, the Boy Scouts could be required
to comply with state anti-discrimination law in its hiring of retail sales clerks. On the other hand, the California Supreme
Court rejected an argument that the Boy Scouts qualified as a
"business establishment" under state law for purposes of its determining membership. 322 Thus, the group could not be forced
to admit an openly gay scout. For the California Supreme
Court, the BSA operates as what I have described here as a
quasi-expressive association.
If the BSA can be considered a quasi-expressive association, a more contextual analysis than the all-or-nothing commercial-expressive distinction should be required to evaluate
its claim to exemption from anti-discrimination law. The BSA
might be required not to discriminate in its employment of retail sales clerks, as the California Supreme Court determined.
317. Id. at 424-25.
318. Curran v. Mount Diablo Council of the Boy Scouts of Am., 952 P.2d
218, 223 (Cal. 1998). For a useful discussion of Curran, see Coolidge, supra

note 316.
319. Curran,952 P.2d at 223.
320. Id. at 238.
321. Id.
322. See id.
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But in its hiring of a national spokesperson, an obviously expressive role, the BSA would be protected.
In Dale itself, under the tripartite approach, the result
would have been the same regardless of whether the BSA is an
expressive or quasi-expressive association. Scoutmasters, who
volunteer their time, serve very much the role that teachers in
a private school serve by functioning as role models and by
bearing the moral messages the association wants to communicate. Their function is fundamentally expressive, not commercial. On the other hand, using an analogy to Runyon, the BSA
might be required to admit openly gay scouts (students) since
their admission might not "inhibit in any way the teaching in
[the BSA] of any idea or dogma.' 3 23
B. ADVANTAGES OF THE TRIPARTITE APPROACH

Assuming an intelligible line can be drawn at protecting
primarily commercial associations from anti-discrimination
law, the question then becomes, why draw the line there? Why
not treat commercial associations the same as expressive associations or quasi-expressive associations for First Amendment
purposes?
1. The Tripartite Approach Focuses on Associational Activity,
Not Message
Some line is going to be drawn somewhere in this area.
There will likely never be absolute protection for the freedom of
association, absolving all organizations from all compliance
with anti-discrimination law. There will also likely never be,
this side of Stalin's republic at least, complete evisceration of
the freedom of association.
Wherever the line is drawn, moreover, there will be linedrawing problems. Therefore, it is not a sufficient objection to
an approach that it involves such problems. Every approach
will present hard cases. Indeed, almost every issue in First
Amendment law raises these difficulties. 324 The question
should be, instead, does the approach adopted attempt to settle
the matter in a way that raises independent First Amendment
323. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 176 (1976) (quoting McCrary v.
Runyon, 515 F.2d 1082, 1087 (4th Cir. 1975)).
324.

CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH

149 (1993) ("There is no way to operate a system of free expression without
drawing lines.... The question is not whether to draw lines, but how to draw
the right ones.").
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concerns? That is, does it draw lines in a way that is itself suspect under the First Amendment?
As I argued above, 325 the vice of the dissent's approach in
Dale is that it focuses intensively on the association's message,
attempting to differentiate between associations that clearly
state their views (entitled to protection) from groups that do
not (not entitled to protection from anti-discrimination law).
The country's experience with state-sponsored suppression of
association should lead us to distrust any approach, like the
dissent's, that asks the group to account for itself based on the
content of its message.
Whatever other faults the tripartite approach may have, by
contrast, at least it does not focus on associations' messages.
Nothing in the approach turns on whether an association has a
particular message, or whether that message is stated in a sufficiently coherent way, or whether the association has chosen
the best messenger. The approach looks only into the underlying activity of the group, an inquiry that simply does not implicate the special First Amendment concerns raised by the dissent's (or any other message-based) approach.
2. The Tripartite Approach Preserves Associational Freedom
Where Expressive Interests Are Likely To Be Greatest and
Where State Regulation and Judicial Scrutiny Are Most
Suspect
Carving out primarily commercial associations from the
freedom of expressive association preserves the freedom where
it is most likely to be tied to the core First Amendment interests in promoting debate about important issues. The idea here
is that the First Amendment is about the free exchange of
ideas, not the free exchange of widgets. It does not protect the
underlying primary activity of a commercial associationcommerce. Regulations of such activity are generally subject
only to rational basis review. It does, however, protect a significant activity of an expressive association or a quasiexpressive association-expression. Although an expressive
association may engage in an unprotected activity (illicit drug
use, for example), its principal social utility is its expression.
That is not the case with a commercial association, whose principal social utility is greasing the wheels of commerce.

325.

See supra Part II.
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This is not to argue that important ideas are not sometimes debated in commercial settings; they are. It is also not to
argue that commercial associations do not sometimes advance
ideas, especially about commerce; they do. It is only to argue
that the primary venues for the discussion of such matters, to
the extent such discussions occur in organizational fora at all,
are expressive and quasi-expressive associations. 326 If a line is
going to be drawn, then, it makes most sense to protect the associations that are nearest the core of the First Amendment
and to relegate to the margin of protection those associations
that are farther away from that core.
Expressive associations also need more judicial protection
327
from state regulation than do commercial associations.
Commercial associations have access to substantial financing
in capital markets and from sales that expressive associations
do not have. Expressive associations are less likely, therefore
to be able to survive or to resist regulation. 328 Quasi-expressive
associations, characterized in part by their substantial economic activity, are more likely to be able to survive state regulation than are expressive associations but less likely to withstand state interference than commercial associations. So
quasi-expressive associations properly occupy a middle ground
of protection.
Additionally, identity is ordinarily less expressive in a
commercial setting than in a non-commercial one. 329 To take a
simple example, customers who come to buy goods in a store
understand that the sales personnel are not there to spread the
ideas of the owners or to transmit their values. They are there
to facilitate the exchange of money for goods, not to debate
matters bearing on democratic self-government. As David
McGowan has written, "the workplace is, and is understood by
all concerned to be, an instrumental setting in which considerations of personal expression are subordinate to legal regulation
of the transaction].1"330 Thus, to the extent anti-discrimination
326. "Corporations generally have not played the historic role of newspapers as conveyers of individual ideas and opinions." Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v.
PUC, 475 U.S. 1, 33 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
327. Farber, supra note 314, at 1497-99.
328. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 772 n.24 (1976).
329. See McGowan, supra note t, at n.62. It should be noted that Professor
McGowan disagrees in part with the outcome in Dale and with my suggested
approach in this area.
330. Id. This argument holds, though with less force, in commercial set-
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law forces commercial associations to associate with people
they would prefer to avoid, at least this forced association is
less likely to intrude on any message they want to send than
would a similar requirement imposed on an expressive association.
This observation about the nature of the differences between commercial and expressive associations raises a related
point. Anti-discrimination laws that restrict the freedom of expressive or quasi-expressive associations are more likely to operate as impermissible content-based restrictions on group
speech than are similar restrictions on commercial associations. 331 Although the state's law may not directly suppress an
association's message based on its content, it may do so indirectly by regulating its membership or other internal affairs.
Forced association with unwanted members may act as a proxy
for impermissible content regulation, just as regulations based
on a speaker's identity ("No Republicans may speak in the
park") or on the communicative impact of speech ("No flagburning that is likely to offend an observer") may act as a proxy
for content regulation. 332 It is clear New Jersey could not directly require the BSA to promulgate a pro-gay message. Yet
the state's membership regulation forcing it to admit openly
gay scoutmasters may have very much the same effect. The
same cannot be said for a commercial association, where the
expressive component of the group's activity is by definition
subordinate to its commercial activity.
Every anti-discrimination law might be said to have two
purposes, one narrow and one broad. The narrow purpose is to
tings other than the workplace. Membership in a situs of business networking, like the Jaycees or the Rotary Club, should be seen as only the step immediately preceding the commencement of commercial transactions. In the
same way, "commercial speech" is only the first step in a commercial exchange
that is fully regulable, see Daniel Farber, Commercial Speech and First
Amendment Theory, 74 Nw. U. L. REV. 372, 386-90 (1979), and thus enjoys
less protection under the First Amendment than core political speech, see
Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Ass'n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 18385 (1999) (subjecting restriction on gambling advertisement to intermediate
scrutiny).
331. Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 628 (1984) (noting that the
state has a compelling interest in providing nondiscriminatory access to
"goods, services, and other advantages.., wholly apart from the point of view

such conduct may transmit").
332. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 411 (1989) ("Whether Johnson's
[flag burning] ... violated Texas Law thus depended on the likely communicative impact of his expressive conduct....

pression is content based.").

[Tihis restriction on Johnson's ex-
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give specific relief to specific claimants. The broad purpose is
to improve the social climate for members of protected classes.
Both of these purposes seem legitimate, yet their significance
varies depending on context. The state's purpose in enforcing
the anti-discrimination law is more suspect when aimed at expressive association than when aimed at commercial association. In the case of expressive associations, it is more likely the
state's primary interest is in trying to change the group's message; in the case of commercial associations, it is more likely
the state's primary interest is in trying to help the target of
333
discrimination get access to economic opportunity.
I am not talking here about the First Amendment protection to be accorded "commercial speech," although that too receives less protection under current First Amendment doctrine
than does political speech or other forms of non-commercial
speech. 334 I am also not talking about the government's regulation of the message of the commercial association, as opposed to
its membership policy and other forms of organizational activity. Content-based restrictions on the message of a commercial
association (to the extent the message is not "commercial
speech") should be subject to scrutiny every bit as strict as such
restrictions on expressive associations or individuals would
5
be. 33
The point is to observe that, at least as the Court has construed it, the freedom of association is parasitic on other First
Amendment freedoms.
It exists only to serve the First
Amendment liberties specifically enumerated, like the rights to
free speech, peaceable assembly, and free exercise of religion.
Without these enumerated freedoms, the freedom of association
would not exist. Associational freedom is not a constitutional
end in itself; it is a means to other ends. So when choices are
made about which kinds of associations to protect, it follows
that expressive associations should be first on the list of protection, with quasi-expressive associations a close second.
The problem with the dissent in Dale is not that it abandoned this basic distinction between commercial and expressive
333. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 628 (noting that the state's interest in regulating discrimination in networking association is "wholly apart from the point
of view such conduct may transmit").
334.

Greater New Orleans BroadcastingAss'n, 527 U.S. at 183 (applying

intermediate scrutiny to commercial speech regulations).
335. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395-96 (1992) (subjecting content-based city ordinance against hate speech to strict scrutiny).

2001]

AFTER DALE: A TRIPARTITE APPROACH

1585

association. The problem with the dissent is that it adopted a
crabbed view of the ways in which an association expresses itself and of the impact membership regulation has on the organization's ability to promote its message.
3. The Distinction Preserves Anti-Discrimination Law Where
the State's Interest Is Most Compelling
The citizenship model of anti-discrimination law insists
that we see the larger picture of civic life, which encompasses
more than purely economic interests. It asks us to look at the
connections between value-formation in associations, the way
disfavored groups of people are treated, and the ultimate access
members of these groups have to material success. The process
that ends in a glass ceiling for women on the job may begin
with their exclusion from networking clubs like the Jaycees, or
it may begin even earlier than that, with their exclusion from
other important clubs where men cultivate social norms that
shut women out somewhere down the line. To secure economic
access, it may be important to secure cultural access. Moreover, access to the centers of norm-creation, like the BSA, may
be important for reasons that have little to do directly with
wealth. It may be important for personal and political development, for example. Finally, life is not so easily compartmentalized into economic and non-economic spheres. One spills
over into, and contributes to, the other.
On the other hand, I suspect even most advocates of the
citizenship model would, if required to do so, rank direct access
to economic success higher in immediate importance than access to non-economic or cultural advantages. In a capitalist
economy, once a person has economic means, other benefits
tend to follow, though less easily for members of certain groups.
It should not be surprising, therefore, that civil rights advocates pushed first for protection in employment and in other
commercial settings (like hotels, restaurants, and other businesses). These protections were preconditions for enjoying the
rest of civic life. As the Supreme Court has recognized, "acts of
invidious discrimination in the distribution of publicly available goods, services, and other advantages cause unique evils
33 6
that government has a compelling interest to prevent."
Simply put, holding a job is more important to most people
than learning morals from a scoutmaster while tying a knot in
336. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 628 (emphasis added).
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front of a campfire. The state's interest is correspondingly
greater in securing citizens' access to the former than to the
latter. The tripartite approach, therefore, preserves antidiscrimination law in those realms of life (commerce) likely to
be most crucial to personal success. It vindicates the economic
model of anti-discrimination law.
4. The Tripartite Approach Reduces the Risk and Cost of
Judicial Error
Judicial error in this area is inevitable. Under a messagebased approach, judicial decisionmakers will sometimes find
ambiguity in the message of a group where there is none, resulting in less First Amendment protection for the group. Under the tripartite approach, judicial decisionmakers will sometimes incorrectly categorize an expressive association as quasiexpressive, or a quasi-expressive association as commercial, resulting in less First Amendment protection for the association.
Neither approach is so objective that it eliminates judicial bias.
However, the tripartite approach reduces the risk of judicial error in comparison to a message-based approach. By concentrating on an association's activities, courts will handle familiar and relatively objective information about a given
association's size, commercial involvement, sales figures, property holdings, number of employees, status as profit-making,
income, and so forth. Concentrating on an association's message, on the other hand, involves inherently subjective judgments about whether a group's expression is sufficiently clear
in relation to its regulated activity. Those subjective judgments
will be fed by confirmation bias, discussed in Part II.C.1, which
will persist over time.
It is more likely that, using the tripartite approach, courts
will slowly develop a fairly reliable set of guidelines for categorizing groups as expressive, commercial, or quasi-expressive
that have nothing to do with the messages those groups advance. Associations will be able to respond to this development
by organizing themselves so as to maximize whatever interests
are paramount to them, whether commercial or expressive.
This feedback loop will further reduce the risk of error.
A version of the message-based approach might reduce the
risk of error by requiring associations to use certain safe-harbor
words in their literature or public statements in order to gain
the protection of the First Amendment from membership regulation. It is hard to know what such words might be or how
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they could cover every case. But in any event, requiring groups
to use some "magic words" to escape anti-discrimination law
seems too wooden and too intrusive on associational speech,
amounting to a state-imposed requirement that associations recite a pledge.
Even if the tripartite approach does not reduce the risk of
error, however, it reduces the cost when that error occurs. For
reasons discussed above, anti-discrimination law may function
as a proxy for content-based regulation.3 37 Applying such law
to expressive associations runs a substantial risk of punishing
unpopular opinion, a significant cost to First Amendment values. The tripartite approach reduces the expected cost of error
by insulating expressive associations from anti-discrimination
law altogether. A message-based approach magnifies this expected cost by subjecting those same338expressive associations to
uncertain and biased clarity review.
CONCLUSION
The approach I have outlined is a compromise. For speech
advocates, it preserves associational freedom where that freedom lays its strongest claim to core First Amendment values
about expression. For equality advocates, it preserves antidiscrimination law where that law relates to core equality values about access to economic success. At the same time, it asks
each side to give up part of its concept of the relationship between private groups and the state. Speech advocates will have
to sacrifice a vision of the First Amendment as a libertarian
charter. Equality advocates will have to accept that there are
limits to the state's power to make people be nice. Each side
will be denied its dream, but saved from its nightmare.
The Boy Scouts are not what the State of New Jersey
wants them to be. They surely are not what I want them to be.
Until they accept the basic dignity of people like James Dale
who exemplify the moral values of honesty and integrity, they
are not even what the Scout Oath and Scout Law say they
should be. But if they want to be defined by a tenacious fight to
ostracize some of their most faithful adherents, then the meaning of the First Amendment is that the state must let them
9
be. 33
337. See supra Part III.B.2.
338. See supra Part 1.C.
339. To the credit of its lawyers, the BSA's briefs in Dale avoided gay-
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We should defend their associational freedom, and the
freedom of all expressive associations, out of principle.3 40 But if
that is not enough, there is always self-interest. The experience of discrimination seems to lead people toward one of two
poles: get government out of our lives to free us or get it into
our lives to protect us. The latter choice is a siren's song, especially tempting when one has gained the upper-hand in a legislature. Yet progress in manipulating government power for
one's ends is not inevitable or irreversible. The norms the state
enforces on private relations are as changeable as culture itself.
When I hear gay writers defend the role of the state as enforcer
of social norms-even norms I share-at the expense of private
choices to the contrary, I think about the painful gay ordeal
with the caretaker state. In Germany, there were nightclubs
for gays in the 1920s and concentration camps for them in the
1940s. The relative tolerance of pre-Depression New York gave
way to the repression of the 1930s. 341 Yesterday New Jersey
declared us criminal;342 today it protects us from discrimination;343 tomorrow it may again find us wanting.
There is a cautionary lesson in this. Somewhere, someday
we will again hear the state's call to heel. When that day
comes we will look for sanctuary. We will be relieved to find
bashing and even invoked gays' interest in associational freedom as a reason
for reversing the New Jersey Supreme Court. Reply Brief for Petitioners at 1,
Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446 (2000) (No. 99-699), available at
2000 WL 432367. Moreover, the most prominent "dog that didn't bark" in the
case was the stereotype of gay men as child molesters. At oral argument,
counsel for the BSA expressly disclaimed fears that gays would behave inappropriately with boys in their charge. See Oral Argument Transcript, Boy
Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 120 S. Ct. 2446 (2000), 2000 WL 489419, at *9-10; cf
Hunter, supra note 4, at 1611. Even if such fears really are at the base of the
gay exclusion, the omission of the argument by itself marks Dale as a significant cultural and legal moment for gay Americans because it suggests the argument has lost much of its credibility. Recall the detective's parting jibe at
Henry Gerber: "What was the idea of the Society for Human Rights anyway?
Was it to give you birds the legal right to rape every boy on the street?" KATZ,
supra note 53, at 392-93. At least the BSA did not argue Dale was demanding
a right to do that.
340. Thirty years after the beginning of the modern gay civil rights movement, "it is not the right to march in other people's parades, but to create and
march in our own, that gay men and lesbians should seek to protect." Hirsch,
supra note 43, at 100.
341.

GEORGE CHAUNCEY, GAY NEW YORK: GENDER, URBAN CULTURE, AND

THE MAKING OF THE GAY MALE WORLD, 1890-1940, at 331-54 (1994).
342. Homosexual sodomy was a criminal act in New Jersey until 1979. See
N.J. STAT. ANN. §2A:143-1 (repealed 1979).
343. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-4, 10:5-5 (1993).
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the First Amendment intact, large enough to accommodate us
and strong enough to fend off the state's long and ready list of
good causes.
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